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 Municipal Bonds: In the Shadow of an Underfunded 
Pension Crisis, Puerto Rico, and a Low Interest Rate 
Environment 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the United States stock market continuing to reach all-time 
highs1 and multiple foreign countries’ interest rates at a negative yield,2 
many leading economists predict a recession in the coming years.3  This 
fear has caused domestic4 and international investors5 to search for 
security and safety in their portfolio holdings.6  Investment safety usually 
comes in the form of low-yield securities.7  These securities often include 
 
 1. See Stephen Grocer, Why Stocks Are Hitting Records as Economic Fears Rise: ‘There 
Is No Alternative’, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/stock-market-record.html 
[https://perma.cc/C8WL-MENJ] (outlining how the stock indexes such as the S&P are hitting 
all-time highs, yet “there’s plenty to worry about” if a recession occurs). 
 2. Eshe Nelson, $12 Trillion of Negative-Yielding Bonds Are Sending a Clear Message 
of Distress, QUARTZ (June 19, 2019), https://qz.com/1647791/12-trillion-of-negative-
yielding-bonds-are-a-distress-signal/ [https://perma.cc/3MJQ-78CR] (explaining that 
“[a]lmost $12 trillion of investment grade corporate and government bonds have negative 
yields” and “half of all European government bonds have a negative yield”). 
 3. Jonelle Marte, 3 out of 4 Economists Predict a U.S. Recession by 2021, Survey Find, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019, 5:40 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/out-economists-predict-us-recession-
by-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/KB8U-X2H3] (“Nearly 3 out of 4 economists surveyed by 
the National Association for Business Economics expect a recession by 2021, according to 
poll results released . . . .”). 
 4. Amrith Ramkumar & Ira Iosebashvili, Investors Rush Into Havens as Growth Fears 
Persist, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2019, 8:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-rush-
into-havens-as-growth-fears-persist-11566207002 [https://perma.cc/GZ2B-6ZYK] (“The 
shift to safer assets is the latest round in investors’ yearlong bout with fears that a global 
slowdown will end the decadelong U.S. expansion.”). 
 5. Michael Wursthorn, There’s No Place Like U.S. in Hunt for Yield, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
29, 2019, 8:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-no-place-like-u-s-in-hunt-for-yield-
11567080003 [https://perma.cc/V3WN-Y47T] (“In a world dominated by tepid economic 
growth, mediocre returns and a mountain of negative-yielding debt, foreign investors say they 
see American assets as a haven . . . .”). 
 6. Phillip Georgiadis, Stocks Suffer Grueling Month as Investors Reach for Safety, FIN. 
TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7344e9c2-8382-11e9-9935-
ad75bb96c849 [https://perma.cc/XN4X-LTTV]. 
 7. See Thomas Kenny, Lowest Risk Bonds: What Types of Bonds Are the Safest?, THE 
BALANCE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/lowest-risk-bonds-what-types-of-
bonds-are-the-safest-417025 [https://perma.cc/PEE8-E36E] (explaining the benefits of 
different types of bonds when an investor’s “most important consideration” is protection). 
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municipal bonds.8  Municipal bond investment is meant to shield 
investors from the strains of global markets and depressed economic 
output.9  However, this shield of investment safety has underlying cracks 
emanating from an underfunded pension crisis in some cities and states.10 
As the fear of an economic slowdown continued to rise in 2019, 
the demand for bonds skyrocketed.11  In some cases, investors put in 
orders for 5.5 times the amount of bonds a municipality was issuing.12  
The increasing demand for yield among investors allowed corporations,13 
 
 8. See Dan Moskowitz, Are Municipal Bonds a Good Investment?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/040115/should-you-consider-muni-
bonds.asp [https://perma.cc/S3AA-77SZ] (last updated Jan. 19, 2020) (explaining why 
municipal bonds can be a preferred choice for an investor’s bond investments). 
 9. See Jessica Menton, Investors Pour Money into Bond Funds at a Record Pace, WALL 
ST. J. (July 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pour-money-into-
bond-funds-at-a-record-pace-11564056000 [https://perma.cc/DJD9-ETVV] (“Investors are 
piling into safe-haven bonds at a record pace, a sign that caution remains despite stocks 
pushing toward records.”). 
 10. See John Coumarianos, Opinion: Muni Bonds Aren’t Risk Free Anymore, MKT. 
WATCH (Jan. 17, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/muni-bond-
investors-left-holding-the-bag-for-pension-debacle-2017-01-16 [https://perma.cc/5XUD-
2YGX] (“Investors are holding the bag for troubled city and state pensions.”); The Pension 
Crisis: The Case Against Municipal Bonds, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 17, 2017, 5:27 PM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4037438-pension-crisis-case-municipal-bonds 
[https://perma.cc/BC33-KTY8] (explaining that “investors are ignoring public pension plan 
liabilities” when weighing risk of municipal bonds); see also Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. 
Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension 
Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 365, 367 (2011) (“But perhaps the single largest problem 
facing municipalities today is the dramatic and growing shortfall in public pension funds.”). 
 11. Menton, supra note 9; see Aaron Weitzman, At this Pace, It’s ‘Impossible’ for 
Issuance to Catch Up with Demand, BOND BUYER (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:14 PM),  
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/at-this-pace-its-impossible-for-issuance-to-catch-up-
with-demand [https://perma.cc/W2T4-F3ZU] (“Demand for municipal bonds is actually 
much stronger so far in 2020 than it was to end 2019, illustrated by record inflows into the 
asset class in the latest reporting week.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Alexandra Scaggs, Municipal Bonds Are in High Demand and Short Supply. 
Where Investors Should Look, BARRONS (June 21, 2019, 5:32 PM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/municipal-bonds-demand-supply-51561152617 
[https://perma.cc/3S3C-3MJM] (explaining in a bond sale for the East Bay Municipal Utility 
District the “tallied up orders” were 5.5 times “the amount of the bonds on offer”). 
 13. See, e.g., Sam Goldfarb, Deere Sells 30-Year Corporate Bonds at Record Low Yields, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/soft-manufacturing-data-
pushes-treasury-yields-lower-11567527238 [https://perma.cc/K5RQ-MB8H] (explaining 
that Deere and Walt Disney have sold their corporate bonds at record low interest rates). 
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universities,14 and municipalities15 to sell bonds earning record low 
interest rates.16  These factors have cumulatively blinded municipal bond 
investors to the growing risk of cities’ and states’ underfunded pension 
plans17 that may affect their municipal investments.18  Investors need to 
consider the risk of a pension crisis among states or municipalities that 
are unable to meet the obligations of their pension plans without 
defaulting on their bond debt.19 
Proceeding in six parts, this Note examines the implications of 
underfunded pensions and past municipal bankruptcies on the safety of 
municipal bond investments and argues that investors inadequately 
consider this risk when buying municipal bonds.  Part II provides 
background information on the municipal bond market.20  Part III 
examines the proliferation of underfunded pensions among the states and 
the implications of this trend.21  Part IV assesses the role of underfunded 
pensions in undermining the safety of municipal bond investments in two 
of the most significant municipal bankruptcy filings in the last two 
decades.22  Part V discusses the two states, New Jersey and Illinois, which 
are currently facing sizeable underfunded pension obligations and low 
 
 14. See, e.g., Gunjan Banerji, Falling Yields Unleash Flood of Muni “Century Bonds”, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/falling-yields-unleash-
flood-of-muni-century-bonds-11568367003 [https://perma.cc/FFB4-FR6L] (detailing how 
universities such as University of Virginia and Rutgers are capitalizing on the low rate climate 
and issuing bonds at “near record lows”). 
 15. See, e.g., id. (“Miami-Dade County, Fla., sold almost $400 million in bonds in August 
for Miami International Airport . . . swapping old debt for taxable debt . . . saved money.”). 
 16. See id. (“Bankers and analysts said they are expecting issuance to remain strong in 
coming months.”). 
 17. Lina Lu et al., Reach for Yield by U.S. Public Pensions 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., 
Working Paper SRA 19-02, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019048pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6VA-
NRQV] (“A public pension plan is underfunded if the present value of its assets is less than 
the net present value of liability payments to its pension holders.”). 
 18. See Spencer Jakab, Prophet of Muni Market Doom Wasn’t Wrong—Just Early, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prophet-of-muni-market-
doom-wasnt-wrongjust-early-1540554098 [https://perma.cc/RQ34-XX6B] (explaining that 
Meredith Whitney, who called the financial crisis of 2008, was merely early when predicting 
a large number of municipality defaults in the future). 
 19. See, e.g., Heidi Moore, Detroit, Tip of a Vast Pensions Liability Iceberg, THE 
GUARDIAN: OPINION (July 18, 2013, 12:11 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/18/detroit-pensions-liability-iceberg 
[https://perma.cc/3VQK-N5CN] (“Detroit’s bankruptcy is, primarily, a lesson in how cities 
and states cannot avoid their pension responsibilities without a backlash of biblical 
proportions.”). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
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municipal bond ratings, resembling the conditions in other bankrupt 
municipalities.23  Part VI summarizes the municipal bond market 
outlook, focusing on the safety of bond investments in higher-risk 
municipalities.24 
II.  MUNICIPAL BONDS AND THEIR PROTECTIONS 
Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by state and city 
governments to fund public projects and functions.25  The municipal bond 
market began in 1812 when New York City issued a general obligation 
bond to pay for digging a canal.26  Great American achievements, such 
as the Erie Canal and the Golden Gate Bridge, were funded by municipal 
bond investors.27  The municipal market began its boom in the mid-1970s 
when states and cities increasingly sought alternative funding for 
infrastructure and public service projects.28  At the end of the first quarter 
of 2019, there was $3.6 trillion worth of municipal bonds outstanding.29 
Municipal bonds are highly sought after because they provide 
tax-free income at the federal level on the interest the bonds pay out to an 
investor.30  Moreover, if investors buy municipal bonds in their home 
state, they will also avoid state and local taxes along with the federal tax 
break.31  This benefit provides an enticing option for investors who are 
looking to enjoy tax-free income, especially if they are in a higher tax 
bracket.32 
 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra Part VI. 
 25. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTORS INFORMATION: MUNICIPAL BONDS, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/municipal-
bonds [https://perma.cc/9P29-KZYB] (last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
 26. Maurie Backman, Your Complete Guide to Municipal Bonds, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 
27, 2019, 5:29 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/your-complete-guide-to-municipal-
bonds.aspx [https://perma.cc/5TBQ-J26W]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local 
Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for 
Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2013). 
 29. Scaggs, supra note 12. 
 30. Rebecca Baldridge, Weighing the Tax Benefits of Municipal Securities, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/taxes/weighing-tax-benefits-of-municipal-
securities/ [https://perma.cc/ZT86-X9QT] (last updated May 30, 2018). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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A. Types of Municipal Bonds 
The two most commonly issued municipal bonds are general 
obligation (“GO”) bonds and special revenue bonds.33  When a 
municipality issues a GO bond, it is typically backed by the “full faith 
and credit” of the issuer.34  GO bonds are not entitled to post-petition 
interest and are treated as unsecured claims, which may be impaired 
during a bankruptcy hearing.35  When a bankruptcy court issues an 
automatic stay,36 it almost always applies to GO bondholders.37  An 
alternative type of bond, making up one-third of the municipal market, is 
the special revenue bond.38  Special revenue bonds are secured or backed 
by a specific revenue stream from a public project or entity.39  Some 
revenue bonds are non-recourse, which means if the bond’s revenue 
stream the bond is backed by no longer produces income, the 
municipality is not required to pay the bondholders.40 
A growing trend for municipalities is to secure some GO bonds 
with statutory liens that tie them to a specific sales tax.41  These bonds 
 
 33. OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC., INVESTOR BULLETIN: MUNICIPAL BONDS: 
UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK, SEC Pub. No. 134, 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipalbondsbulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3X-
7EKC] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. HARRIET M. WELCH, JORDAN A. KROOP & SHERRI L DAHL, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS, 
CLIENT ALERT: MUNICIPAL RESTRUCTURING SOLUTIONS: DETROIT AND BEYOND 20 (2013), 
https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/events/2013/08/municipal-
restructuring-solutions—detroit-and-b__/files/presentation 
powerpoint/fileattachment/municipalrestructuringsolutionsdetroitandbeyond.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5Q2-5C6Z]. 
 36. The automatic stay applied in Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings stops all collection 
actions against the debtor and its property upon the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 922(a) 
(2018). 
 37. WELCH, KROOP & DAHL, supra note 35. 
 38. Jane Sasseen, How Puerto Rico’s Financial Storms Washing Over the Mainland, 
QUARTZ (Mar. 8, 2019), https://qz.com/1557486/puerto-ricos-bond-saga-is-messing-up-
mainland-municipal-markets/#site-content [https://perma.cc/N6QP-L65L] (Adam Stern, co-
head of research at bond market specialists Breckinridge Capital Advisors, “estimates that 
special revenue bonds now make up around a third of the $3.8 trillion municipal bond market 
in the U.S”). 
 39. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 25; 11 U.S.C. § 902(2). 
 40. UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK, supra note 33. 
 41. See, e.g., Karen Pierog, Chicago Mayor Eyes Big Bond Refunding to Save $200 
Million for Budget, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:46 PM),  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
chicago-bonds/chicago-mayor-eyes-big-bond-refunding-to-save-200-million-for-budget-
idUSKBN1X02CC [https://perma.cc/7KR7-2AFY] (explaining  Chicago—in an attempt to 
balance its great deficit—issued subordinate lien bonds that gave investors a statutory lien on 
the city’s sales tax in order to receive an investment-grade rating). 
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allow the municipality to back the bonds with a statutory requirement 
paid out directly from the annual budget.42  GO bonds that are backed by 
statutory liens may be treated as secured claims and therefore are not cut 
off from post-petition interest.43  A municipality will issue GO bonds 
with higher protections to receive a better bond rating and, in turn, a lower 
interest rate because of the safety the statutory lien gives to the 
bondholder.44  The trend of issuing bonds with enhanced protections may 
seem to be in the bondholders’ interest, but it can indicate a 
municipality’s poor financial condition since the municipality gives up 
dedicated tax revenue streams.45 
B. Default Rate and Bond Ownership 
The apparent safety of municipal bonds for investors is wrapped 
up in the historically low default rate.46  The municipality default rate of 
investment-grade bonds47  has consistently held at 0.8%.48  Non-
 
 42. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND HOLDERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, 
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 3, 
https://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/other.orgs/nabl.gobonds.8.14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FYR3-D6XF] (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (stating GO bonds can carry “an 
affirmative statutory requirement to provide for maturing debt service in the annual budget”). 
 43. Id. at iii. 
 44. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND HOLDERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND PAYMENTS: 
STATUTORY LIENS AND RELATED DISCLOSURES  8 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/RBP/wp_statliens_final_dec2017.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/9Z83-HAAW]  (“The presence of a statutory lien influences the decisions 
of the various market participants, and is particularly important in the case of obligors with 
weaker credit profiles or an increased risk of defaulting or entering into bankruptcy.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Martin Z. Braun, Once-Safest Muni Bonds Tainted as Investors Await 
Downgrades, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2018, 8:28 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/once-safest-muni-bonds-tarnished-
as-investors-await-downgrades [https://perma.cc/FLF7-NG8K] (explaining that Illinois 
issuance of sales tax bonds continue to take a hit due to the state’s financial health); see also 
Chung, supra note 28, at 1482 (“Municipal securities issuers also depend upon different, and 
less elastic, sources of funds for debt repayment.”). 
 46. See Chung, supra note 28, at 1460–61 (“Municipal securities are marketed to 
investors as ‘widow and orphan’ securities—i.e., safe for vulnerable and risk averse 
investors—because state and local government issuers rarely default or obtain discharge.”). 
 47. James Chen, Investment Grade, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investmentgrade.asp [https://perma.cc/FNC5-5P7Q] 
(last updated July 15, 2019) (explaining investment grade bonds are rated as low as BBB- or 
Baa and indicate a lower risk of credit default). 
 48. Thomas Kenny, The Risk of Municipal Bonds, THE BALANCE (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/the-risks-of-municipal-bonds-417146 [https://perma.cc/8SZZ-
ZM4Q]. 
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investment grade49 municipal bonds have had a default rate of 
approximately 7.94%.50  Although the default rates are low, they do not 
accurately reflect the market risk and health of municipalities.51  Many 
cities cannot file for bankruptcy without permission52 and, if available, 
can only seek Chapter 953 bankruptcy to restructure debts.54  This 
inability to restructure debt outside of bankruptcy has skewed the default 
rate positively without taking into account the inner workings of a state’s 
attempt to illustrate health by shifting the burden of bond repayment to 
the taxpayers in order to maintain the status quo and investment-grade 
ratings of the state’s respective bonds.55 
Municipal bonds are owned by households, nonprofit 
organizations, mutual and closed-end funds, banks, broker-dealers, and 
exchange-traded funds.56  Households and nonprofits hold the most 
exposure to municipal bonds, with most citizens buying their state 
municipal bonds because of the bonds’ tax exempt status.57  Mutual funds 
carry the second-largest exposure to municipal bonds, followed by banks 
in third.58  Therefore, any municipal bond default will likely have an 
impact across financial sectors.59 
 
 49. What does Investment Grade Mean?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-does-investment-grade-mean/ 
[https://perma.cc/N8V7-YL23] (last updated May 16, 2019) (explaining that non-investment 
grade bonds are risky assets and the probability of the issuer repaying the debt is 
“speculative”). 
 50. Kenny, supra note 48 (“From 1970-2011, 7.94% of below-investment-grade 
municipal bonds defaulted.”). 
 51. Chung, supra note 28, at 1461–62. 
 52. See Municipal Bankruptcy State Laws, GOVERNING, 
https://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-municipal-bankruptcy-laws-policies-map.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5HR-JMSJ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (outlining the various bankruptcy 
laws among the states); Vaneeta Chintamaneni, The Unraveling of an American City: 
Pensions, Municipal Debt, and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 22 ELDER L.J. 523, 539–40 (2015) (“In 
1994, Congress amended Chapter 9 so that eligibility for Chapter 9 was required to be 
‘specifically authorized,’ which means that states must explicitly permit Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
for cities to be eligible.”). 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 902 (2018). 
 54. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 539–40.  (explaining municipalities are only 
allowed to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, no other form of restructuring is available). 
 55. See Chung, supra note 28, at 1462. (“[Municipal bond] default risk does not tell the 
whole story for issuers and taxpayers, because it does not capture risks and costs that issuers 
and taxpayers incur to keep default and discharge rates low.”). 
 56. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL BOND OWNERSHIP 1–2 (2018), 
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/MSRB-Brief-Trends-Bond-Ownership.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JUA-ZH34]. 
 57. Id.; see Baldridge, supra note 30 (explaining tax-benefits of municipal bonds). 
 58. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., supra note 56, at 2. 
 59. See id. (showing the various stakeholders of municipal bonds). 
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C.  Changing Landscape for Banks’ Municipal Bond Ownership 
In the current low interest rate environment,60 some banks are 
preparing for the possibility that United States’ Federal Reserve interest 
rate will reach zero.61  President Donald J. Trump is a proponent of a 
zero-rate.62  This forces banks to find substitute sources of revenue to 
compensate for the smaller interest they receive on loans.63  Many banks 
are turning to non-interest dependent fees such as ATM fees, overcharge 
fees, and monthly service fees to provide a more stable source of 
income.64  These fees, along with others, could alienate some 
customers.65  Municipal bonds can provide an alternative source of 
income and healthy returns to banks with limited risk, especially in light 
of an amendment to liquidity rules.66 
On August 22, 2018, the three Federal Banking agencies—The 
Office of Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the 
 
 60. James Chen, Low Interest Rate Environment Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/low-interest-rate-environment.asp 
[https://perma.cc/8MRJ-YMZN] (last updated Apr. 26, 2019) (“A low interest rate 
environment occurs when the risk-free rate of interest, typically set by a central bank, is lower 
than the historic average for a prolonged period of time. In the United States, the risk-free rate 
is generally defined by the interest rate on Treasury securities.”). 
 61. See, e.g., David Benoit, JPMorgan CEO Dimon Raises Specter of Zero Rates, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jpmorgan-ceo-dimon-raises-
specter-of-zero-rates-11568147683 [https://perma.cc/K49D-95SD] (“The biggest bank in the 
U.S. [JPMorgan] is starting to prepare how to make money if interest rates in the U.S. drop to 
zero . . . Low interest rates squeeze margins banks make on loans. Hitting zero or negative 
rates raises complex questions about how to charge customers for loans and still make 
money.”). 
 62. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2019, 3:42 AM) 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1171735691769929728 [https://perma.cc/XC86-
29CY] (“The Federal Reserve should get our interest rates down to ZERO, or less, and we 
should then start to refinance our debt . . . .”). 
 63. See Irina Ivanova, Bank Fees Around the U.S. Climb to Record Highs, CBS (Oct. 2, 
2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bank-fees-hit-a-record-high-this-year-
2019/ [https://perma.cc/V5YT-76UQ] (“And now that the Fed is lowering interest rates, 
which affects how much profit banks can make on loans, banks are likely to try adding or 
raising their fees . . . .”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Benoit, supra note 61 (“Banks would also have to grapple with whether to charge 
customers for their deposits without alienating them, a dynamic U.S. consumers and 
businesses haven’t yet dealt with.”). 
 66. See James A. Klotz, Reversal on Banks Rules a Win for Muni Bonds, FMSBONDS 
(May 25, 2018), https://www.fmsbonds.com/news-and-perspectives/reversal-on-bank-rules-
a-win-for-muni-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/6WZW-C73Y] (explaining that the new HQLAs 
rule makes municipal bonds an attractive option for banks). 
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—jointly adopted a rule67 that 
amends the agencies respective liquidity coverage ratio (“LCR”)68 
applied to banks, and will now treat any municipal bond that is both (1) 
“liquid and readily marketable”69 and (2) “investment grade”70 as level 
2B high-quality liquid assets (“HQLAs”).71  The initial rule, which 
became effective on January 1, 2015, did not consider municipal bonds 
liquid.72  The amended rule will allow municipal bonds, as now Level 2B 
assets, to be discounted at a 50% rate when calculating LCR, meaning if 
a bank holds $100 in municipal bonds that meet the two-prong criteria, 
then $50 counts towards the LCR ratio.73  This regulatory change has 
made the proper use of municipal bonds an attractive option for safe, 
partially-liquid income, netting higher interest rates compared to 
treasuries.74 
A problem for banks could arise in their lower-rated municipal 
bond holdings, as there are multiple recent examples of banks’ 
purchasing bonds from low-rated municipal issuers—Illinois and 
 
 67. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Rule: Treatment of Certain Municipal Obligations as High-
Quality Liquid Assets, 84 Fed. Reg. 25976 (July 5, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 329, 
12 C.F.R. pt. 249, 12 C.F.R. pt. 50).  
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/06/05/2019-11715/liquidity-coverage-
ratio-rule-treatment-of-certain-municipal-obligations-as-high-quality-liquid 
[https://perma.cc/W4FC-5X32]. 
 68. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) “refers to the proportion of highly liquid assets 
held by financial institutions, to ensure their ongoing ability to meet short-term obligations. 
This ratio is essentially a generic stress test that aims to anticipate market-wide shocks and 
make sure that financial institutions possess suitable capital preservation, to ride out any short-
term liquidity disruptions, that may plague the market.” Chris B. Murphy, Liquid Coverage 
Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity-coverage-ratio.asp 
[https://perma.cc/Y2Q9-KXUP] (last updated Dec. 12, 2019). 
 69. Liquid and readily-marketable means “that the security is traded in an active 
secondary market with: (1) more than two committed market makers; (2) a large number of 
non-market maker participants on both the buying and selling sides of transactions; (3) timely 
and observable market prices; and (4) a high trading volume.” 12 C.F.R § 249.3 (2018). 
 70. Investment grade means “the issuer of a security has an adequate capacity to meet 
financial commitments under the security for the projected life of the asset or exposure. An 
issuer has an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if the risk of default by the 
obligor is low and the full and timely repayment of principal and interest is expected.” § 1.2(d) 
 71. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Rule: Treatment of Certain Municipal Obligations as High-
Quality Liquid Assets (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 329, 12 C.F.R. pt. 249, 12 C.F.R. pt. 
50). 
 72. Klotz, supra note 66. 
 73. See 12 C.F.R. Part 249.21(b)(3) (2018) (“The level 2B liquid asset amount equals 50 
percent of the fair value of all level 2B liquid assets held by the Board-regulated institution as 
of the calculation date that are eligible HQLA.”). 
 74. Klotz, supra note 66. 
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Chicago—in large quantities.75  These bonds were rated a notch or two 
above investment-grade.76  Banks should weigh the risk of downgrade 
carefully if the purchase of these bonds are for liquidity purposes because 
low-rated bonds would likely no longer be eligible as HQLAs if 
downgraded below “investment grade” status.77 
Despite the August 2018 beneficial rule for municipal bond 
ownership, the corporate tax cut in early 201878 combined with the new 
accounting standard,79 have decreased banks’ appetite and holdings of 
municipal bonds sharply.80  As of the third quarter of 2019, banks’ 
 
 75. Karen Pierog, Investors Grab Hefty Yields in Illinois and Chicago Bond 
Sales, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/illinois-
bonds/investors-grab-hefty-yields-in-illinois-and-chicago-bond-sales-idUSL1N21D1PF 
[https://perma.cc/G6QW-LMMT] [hereinafter Illinois & Chicago Bond Sale] (explaining in 
March 2019, Illinois and its struggling City of Chicago issued over 1.1 billion of GO bonds 
and Chicago’s issuance made up $770 million of the total; Bank of America “beat out eight 
other bidders for $300 million of taxable bonds and 13 other bidders for $140 million of tax-
exempt bonds.”); Karen Pierog, Illinois’ Municipal Market Penalty Eases in $750 Million 
Bond Sale, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/illinois-
bonds/investors-grab-hefty-yields-in-illinois-and-chicago-bond-sales-idUSL1N21D1PF 
[https://perma.cc/ZPD3-FC96] [hereinafter Illinois Bond Sale] (explaining in November 
2019, Illinois issued $750 million of GO bonds. Despite Illinois “lowest credit rating 
compared to any other state,” and Bank of America bought $450 million of the bonds and 
Barclays Capital bought $350 million). 
 76. Illinois & Chicago Bond Sale supra note 75; Illinois Bond Sale, supra note 75. 
 77. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.2(d) (2018) (explaining the requirements for investment grade 
securities). 
 78. The federal corporate tax cut of 2018 made banks less in need of the tax-saving 
benefits of municipal bonds, causing banks to “slash their exposure” of the less attractive 
securities. Michelle Kaske, Biggest U.S. Banks Slash Muni-Bond Holdings After Tax Cut, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
08-27/biggest-u-s-banks-slash-muni-bond-holdings-after-tax-rate-cut 
[https://perma.cc/8GTK-JDKA]. 
 79. FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE, DERIVATIVES AND HEDGING 184 (August 
2017), https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/38/112270638.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GW4-2NV5]; 
see Tom Kozlik, Has Bank Municipal Bond Activity Been Affected by the New Hedge 
Accounting Rules?, PNC (May 23, 2018),  https://www.riverarchcap.com/content/dam/pnc-
com/pdf/corporateandinstitutional/MunicipalBond/bank-municipal-bond-5-23-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AG3Q-24FJ]  (explaining the new accounting standard implemented in 
2018 allowed banks to reclassify held to maturity securities (municipal bonds) to available-
for-sale).  Banks can use these new rules to move some of its municipal holdings to their 
available-for-sale category and then sell off more risky debt. Kozlik, supra. 
 80. FED. RES. BD. FIN. ACCT. OF THE U.S. (Dec. 12, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20191212/html/l212.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3ARR-KGJX] (showing steady decrease of banks’ municipal holdings). 
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municipal bond ownership continued its decline from its high of $572.6 
billion to $469.8 billion.81 
Figure 182 
III.  THE UNDERFUNDED PENSION CRISIS, “ACHILLES HEEL” FOR BOND 
HOLDERS 
States’ underfunded pension liabilities will likely eventually lead 
to some municipal defaults without intervention.83  In 2017, there was a 
$1.28 trillion funding gap in pensions.84  On a market basis, the total 
pension debt in the U.S. is over $5 trillion.85  A healthy pension fund 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Data derived from the Federal Reserve as of the third quarter of 2019. Id. 
 83. See Greg Mennis, Susan Banta, & David Draine, Assessing the Risk of Fiscal Distress 
for Public Pensions: State Stress Test Analysis 1 (M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series  
No. 9, 2018), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/AWP_92_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GE6L-8LSN] (concluding that public pensions “may be more vulnerable to 
an economic downturn than they have ever been” and “states like New Jersey and Kentucky, 
which are severely underfunded, are at high risk of insolvency”). 
 84. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE STATE PENSION FUNDING GAP: 2017 2 (June 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CD5G-JSGJ] [hereinafter PENSION FUNDING GAP]. 
 85. PENSION TRACKER, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y. RES., https://us.pensiontracker.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/V5BC-Z63R] (last visited on Jan. 6, 2020); see Chuck DeVore, 5.2 Trillion 
of Government Pension Debt Threatens to Overwhelm State Budgets, Taxpayers, FORBES 
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should be maintained at a funded ratio of at least 80%.86  In states such 
as Illinois and New Jersey, however, the pension accounts cover 
approximately 35% of outstanding pension obligations.87  Pension plan 
funding methods help to explain this low ratio.88 
A. Pension Funding 
Public employer pension plans for state and local government 
workers cover approximately 21 million full and part-time workers.89  
State and local governments sponsor more than 55,000 pension plans 
state employees are enrolled in.90  These plans are funded by the 
employee over his career and by the city or state as administrator of the 
pension.91  The pension fund itself is considered an unfunded pension 
plan because it relies on a continuous stream of revenue from its state or 
local government sponsor.92  This form of funding allows the employee’s 
contributions to go into a single source that makes investments, the 
earnings from which pay benefits to the employee when he or she 
retires.93  The pensions are funded primarily by investment returns,94 with 
employer and employee contributions making up less than one-third of 
 
(May 31, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2019/05/31/5-2-
trillion-of-government-pension-debt-threatens-to-overwhelm-state-budgets-
taxpayers/#49c0e767759d [https://perma.cc/U67S-8U5H] (explaining how $5 trillion of 
pension debt will have negative consequences on state budgets). 
 86. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 368–69 (“Public pension plans typically are 
considered to be adequately funded at the 80% level because, ironically enough, public 
employers are assumed to be more financially stable than private corporations.”); see, e.g., 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-983T, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION 
PLANS: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNDED STATUS 18 (2008) (applying a 80% funded ratio 
when determining if a pension fund is healthy). 
 87. See PENSION FUNDING GAP, supra note 84, at 16–17. 
 88. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369. 
 89. URBAN INSTITUTE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION, 
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-
initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-government-pensions 
[https://perma.cc/U8JB-WPNU] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 90. Id. 
 91. AM. ASS’N OF RETIRED PERSONS, PENSION CONTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS  2, 
https://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/articles/work/contribution-requirements.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DVT-URA9] [hereinafter PENSION REQUIREMENTS] (last visited Jan. 22, 
2020). 
 92. Julia Kagan, Unfunded Pension Plan, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unfunded-pension-plan.asp [https://perma.cc/54JT-
77J5] (last updated July 28, 2019). 
 93. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2. 
 94. Id. (explaining investments make up approximately 68% of contributions towards a 
pension fund.). 
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the combined total.95  Therefore, pension funds rely on a healthy market 
to meet their obligations to retirees.96 
At least once every two years,97 actuaries calculate the total cost 
needed to sustain the pension in full or the Annual Required 
Contributions (“ARC”).98  The ARC is composed of many factors, with 
the most influential being the assumed rate of return.99  The assumed rate 
of return is the rate at which the fund expects to earn on its investments 
during the year.100  Unlike corporate pension plans regulated by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), there is no 
regulator for state and local government plans;101  therefore, there is 
generally no federal legal obligation for the state to make the 
contributions set by the actuary unless required by state and local law or 
mandate.102  For this reason, the state may have no obligation to make up 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Heather Gillers, The Risk Pension Funds Can’t Escape, WALL. ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2018, 
8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-pensions-are-still-betting-more-than-half-of-
all-assets-on-stocks-1519131600 [https://perma.cc/PN89-JWYT] (explaining the 
“vulnerability” of pensions is from the “significant risk from one basic investment: stocks”). 
 97. Statement No. 27 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board NO. 116-C 1, 4, 
paragraph 9 (Nov. 1994), https://www.gasb.org/resources/ccurl/44/286/GASBS-27.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9HFC-DSDG] (“[The Government Accounting Standards Board mandates] 
for financial reporting purposes, an actuarial valuation should be performed at least 
biennially.”). 
 98. Id. at 4, fn. 5 (“[The ARC] is based on a projection of covered payroll for the period 
to which the ARC will apply. Some employers make contributions based on projected covered 
payroll; others contribute based on budgeted or actual covered payroll for the year. Any of 
those measures of covered payroll, consistently applied, is acceptable for calculating annual 
pension cost and the NPO [net pension obligation], if any.”); see also PENSION 
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2 (“These actuaries calculate the cost associated with new 
benefits earned in that year (also called the “normal cost”) plus any additional amount that 
might be required to make up for shortfalls that have developed in the past.”); see generally 
Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 374–75 (“Unlike the strict accounting rules of private-
pension plans, established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), GASB is 
much more flexible.”). 
 99. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“These funding shortfalls are further 
compounded in many cases by the unrealistically optimistic assumptions used to calculate 
funding status in the first place.”). 
 100. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2. 
 101. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 373 (2011) (“Neither ERISA nor the PBGC have 
any role in the creation, administration, modification, enforcement, or termination of public 
pension plans.”); see Chung, supra note 28, at 1486 (“The regulatory and financial reporting 
regimes applicable to municipal securities issuers and municipal securities offerings also 
make the market less transparent, and more opaque in terms of risk, compared to other market 
segments.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Yvette Shields, Funded Ratios Erode for Downstate and Suburban Illinois 
Pension Funds, BOND BUYER (Aug. 6, 2019, 3:03 PM), 
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/funded-ratios-for-downstate-and-suburban-illinois-
pension-funds-erode [https://perma.cc/QHV8-L9G5] (explaining Illinois has a state mandate 
to reach a 90% funded ratio within the next few years). 
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the difference when pension contributions fall short of meeting the 
funding needs.103  Pensions become unhealthily underfunded in two 
ways: (1) when the plan sponsor does not contribute the ARC amount or 
(2) when the assumed rate of return ends up being above the actual 
investment return causing a shortfall regardless of the contribution.104 
Regarding the first way, during the 2008 recession, pension assets 
fell from $3.2 trillion to $2.3 trillion.105  Since 2008, the majority of states 
and local governments have fallen short in making their ARC payments 
to their pension funds, causing remaining obligations for each year to turn 
into liabilities.106  Regarding the second way, the overestimation of the 
assumed rate of return is broadly scrutinized by scholars and market 
participants.107 Pension funds may overestimate their assumed rate of 
return to allow the state or city to make lower contributions in a given 
year.108 
The funds also use a discount rate109 equal to the assumed rate of 
return when calculating the total underfunded status.110  Therefore, the 
 
 103. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 373 (“[F]ederal law generally does not 
require municipal governments to maintain the funding or report on the funded status of their 
pension plans.”). 
 104. See PENSION FUNDING GAP, supra note 84, at 16–17 (explaining ways pension funds 
begin to become underfunded). 
 105. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 3. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, THE CASE FOR NEW 
PENSION ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 12, (May 2019), 
https://www.ncpers.org/files/The%20Case%20for%20New%20Pension%20Accounting%20
Standards_May%202019.pdf  [https://perma.cc/2GQZ-XCPW]  (“Though there are many 
finance officers and city council members across the country who have complaints to make 
about Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules, most of these complaints 
have to do with the issue of funding levels and assumed rates of return.”). 
 108. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369  (“These funding shortfalls are further 
compounded in many cases by the unrealistically optimistic assumptions used to calculate 
funding status in the first place.”); Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 528 (“In addition, in recent 
decades municipalities used overly optimistic projections for rates of return and economic 
forecasts.”). 
 109. Discount Rate is the “valuation method used to estimate the value of an investment 
based on its expected future cash flows, [and] the viability of a project or an investment by 
calculating the present value of expected future cash flows using a discount rate.” Jim 
Chappelow, Discount Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountrate.asp [https://perma.cc/TNY7-VHSH] 
(last updated Jan. 29, 2020). 
 110. See Jamie Lenney, Bryan Lutz, & Louise Sheiner, The Sustainability of State and 
Local Government Pensions: A Public Finance Approach 5 (July 14, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/lenney_lutz_sheiner_MFC_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCU9-
YFAZ] (“State and local governments have typically chosen to use a discount rate equal to 
the assumed rate of return on risky plan assets.”). 
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pension funds are assuming the investment return for the year, typically 
7–8%, will continue indefinitely, going against standard financial 
principles that use a risk-free rate of return.111  Using the assumed rate of 
return as the discount rate causes the plan’s overall health to appear better 
on paper by lowering its total expected liabilities112 even while many 
plans continuously fail to meet their set assumed rate of return.113  In 
2019, pension plans expected an average return of 7.25% from their 
investments,114 but some realized at least half a percentage point less.115  
Even when pensions met their assumed rate of returns, many funds’ 
liabilities continued to grow.116 
When pension funds begin to lower their assumed rate of return, 
which in practice equals their discount rate,117 the health of the pension 
 
 111. See id. (“[S]tandard financial principles of valuation suggest that a stream of future 
payments should be discounted at a rate which reflects the probability that the payments will 
be honored (i.e. at a rate reflecting the riskiness of future stream of payment.”); REPORT OF 
THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 16 (St. Budget Crisis Task Force January 2014), 
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/state_budget_crisis_task_for
ce.pdf  [https://perma.cc/7D7L-RT6V] (“Economists and financial analysts generally 
discount future payments using rates that reflect the risk associated with the promised 
payments, relative to the broader market. Since most public pension benefits have strong legal 
protections, the appropriate discount rates should be comparable to other low risk assets.”). 
 112. See Lenney, Lutz & Sheiner, supra note 110 at 5 (“With lower discount rates, pension 
debt is typically much larger than stated in annual government accounting statements and 
most plans are far from being fully pre-funded – i.e. assets are well below the present value 
of future benefit payments.”); Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“If more realistic (or 
at least more conservative) discount rates are used, the underfunding of public-pension plans 
becomes even more pronounced.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Rob Kozlowski, Chicago Policeman Fund Returns 4.5% for Fiscal Year, 
PENSIONS & INVS. (Oct. 3, 2019, 12:02 PM), https://www.pionline.com/pension-
funds/chicago-policemen-fund-returns-45-fiscal-year [https://perma.cc/3R9N-NGJJ] 
(explaining that in 2019 the police fund in Illinois fund fell short of its “policy benchmark 
returns of 6.1%” only gaining 4.5% on investment returns). 
 114. Amit Sinha, Low Interest Rates are Compounding the Big Problems Facing Pension 
Funds, MKT. WATCH (Sept. 3, 2019, 9:16 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/low-
interest-rates-are-compounding-the-big-problems-facing-pension-funds-2019-08-30 
[https://perma.cc/THA4-6Q9D]. 
 115. See Liz Farme, Amid Concerns of Recession, Pension Plan Returns Fall Short, 
GOVERNING (Aug. 16, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/week-in-finance/gov-
pension-plan-returns-falling-short-expectations.html [https://perma.cc/S7B5-AKBN] (“Plans 
with more than $1 billion in assets earned a median return of 6.79 percent for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, according to the firm Wilshire Trust Universe Comparison Service.”). 
 116. See Heather Gillers, The Long Bull Market Has Failed to Fix Public Pensions, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-longest-u-s-bull-
market-has-failed-to-fix-the-nations-public-pensions-115548886 [https://perma.cc/E963-
TC6C] (explaining the benefit of the “10-year-long-bull market” has failed to fix the 
underlying issues of pension funds). 
 117. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Saret, Barbara Zhan & Subhadeep Mitra, Investment Return 
Assumptions of Public Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVS. (Mar. 23, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170323/ONLINE/170319953/investment-return-
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fund dims.118  Each tenth of a percentage point decrease in the assumed 
rate of return causes an estimated 1–1.5% increase in the total pension 
obligation,119 thereby increasing the difference municipalities must 
reconcile each year.120 A municipality or state will commonly use two 
strategies to make up for underfunding in a pension plan: (1) issue more 
debt to cover the hole, or (2) increase its contributions through its taxing 
power.121 
Under the first strategy, some states have turned to a new form of 
bond, pension obligation bonds (“POBs”), to make up for inadequate 
contributions or investment returns.122  States issue POBs to shore up 
underfunded pension obligations, issuing municipal bonds under the 
belief that investment returns on the borrowed money will outpace the 
fixed interest rate on the bond payments.123  POB issuance has preceded 
the bankruptcies of Stockton, California; San Bernardino, California; and 
Puerto Rico.124  Many experts disfavor this type of issuance, arguing that 
 
assumptions-of-public-pension-funds [https://perma.cc/6749-EEMR] (“The $311 billion 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System saw its funded status fall four percentage 
points to 69% and reduced its assumed investment rate of return to 7% from 7.5%.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Samantha Marcus, N.J. Is Facing a $1.2B Public-Worker Pension Time 
Bomb, NJ.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nj.com/politics/2019/09/nj-is-facing-a-12b-
public-worker-pension-time-bomb.html [https://perma.cc/4ZW6-Y5DS] (explaining after 
Chris Christie tweaked the pension assumed rate of return by half a point the state’s actuarially 
recommended pension contribution increased by 390.3 million). 
 119. Clive Lipshitz & Ingo Walter, Commentary: A Roadmap for Preventing U.S. Public 
Pension Funds from Becoming a Taxpayer Burden, PENSIONS & INVS. (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:00 
AM), https://www.pionline.com/industry-voices/commentary-roadmap-preventing-us-
public-pension-funds-becoming-taxpayer-burden [https://perma.cc/8V4A-QR6Y]. 
 120. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 118 (showing that when the assumed rate of return 
lowers, as it did in New Jersey, for the pension plan, the obligations for the state or local 
government sponsor increases). 
 121. See Brian Chappatta, Pension Obligation Bonds May Soon Have Their Moment, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-
10/pension-obligation-bonds-may-soon-have-their-moment [https://perma.cc/ZX9D-5NPT] 
(predicting pension obligation bonds will likely be used in the future as an alternative to 
increasing contributions). 
 122. Sarah Breitenbach, Despite Risks, State and Local Governments Turn to Pension 
Obligation Bonds, PEW (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/08/12/despite-risks-state-and-local-governments-turn-to-
pension-obligation-bonds [https://perma.cc/Z34Q-H373]. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Erick Schulzke, Pension Obligation Bonds: Risky Gimmick or Smart 
Investment?, GOVERNING (Jan. 2013),  https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-
pension-obligation-bonds-risky-or-smart.html [https://perma.cc/AG9Q-VT5C] (“The bonds 
took on some notoriety this past summer when two California cities, Stockton and San 
Bernardino, went bankrupt.”); see also Marc Joffe, Local Governments Beware: Pension 
Obligation Bonds Are a Risky Response to Rising CALPERS Bills, REASON FOUND. (Dec. 12, 
2018), https://reason.org/commentary/pension-obligation-bonds-are-a-risky-response-to-
rising-calpers-bills/ [[https://perma.cc/WJ6B-5WSR] (“Indeed, issuers could be in for a 
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municipalities’ assumed investment return rates typically do not exceed 
the cost of paying back the loan,125 and the issuance itself reflects the 
negative health of the issuer.126  Despite their unsafe nature, distressed 
municipalities continue to issue POBs to willing buyers.127 
Under the second strategy, state and local governments typically 
increase the tax burden of their citizens to help maintain pension 
funding.128  Usually, there is only so much a tax base can sustain before 
a state or city sees citizens leaving at a higher rate than moving in.129  One 
 
repeat of the fiasco that befell Puerto Rico, which issued POBs at the beginning of the 2008 
crash—a move that contributed to the commonwealth’s bankruptcy.”). 
 125. See Schulzke, supra note 124 (“Over the years, returns on POBs have often fallen 
below the interest rate the state or locality paid to borrow the money, digging the liability hole 
even deeper.”); GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, Pension Obligation Bonds (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.gfoa.org/pension-obligation-bonds [https://perma.cc/Y33X-8K63] (“The 
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends that state and local 
governments do not issue POBs.”). 
 126. See Alicia Munnell, Jean Puererr Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, An Update on Pension 
Obligation Bonds, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH BOS. C. (July 2014),  
https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/slp_40.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9GX-6JSQ] 
(“The results show that governments are more likely to issue POBs if the plan represents a 
substantial obligation to the government, they have substantial debt outstanding, and they are 
short of cash . . . financial pressures play a major role.”); Alicia Munnell, Be Wary of Pension 
Obligation Bonds, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:01 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/be-wary-of-pension-obligation-bonds-2015-04-15 
[https://perma.cc/HFK4-7J7J] (“Despite the risks, the data show that the issuance of a POB is 
driven not by careful planning among well-funded plans or by restructuring for sustainability 
among underfunded plans but rather by great financial stress among plans that have not been 
paying their pension bills.”). 
 127. See Keeley Webster, Pension Bonds Are Staging a Comeback in California, BOND 
BUYER (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/pension-bonds-are-staging-a-
comeback-in-california [https://perma.cc/6AHP-T3QS] (explaining low interest rates have 
caused a “new influx” of POB issuance, with hundreds of millions issued by California 
municipalities since 2007). 
 128. See, e.g., Elizabeth Campbell, Chicago Seeks Tax Hike to Avert Insolvency for 
Pension Fund, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2016, 1:34 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-03/chicago-seeks-tax-hike-to-avert-
insolvency-for-largest-pension [https://perma.cc/M4H8-JKUE] (explaining Chicago is using 
tax hikes in utilities to try to keep the city’s largest pension fund from insolvency). 
 129. See, e.g., Kate Linebaugh, Detroit’s Population Crashes, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 23, 
2011, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704461304576216850733151470 
[https://perma.cc/E3MZ-HN8D] (explaining Detroit’s population declined by 25% in the 
years before its bankruptcy); Shawn M. Carter, People are Fleeing from New Jersey More 
Than Any Other State,” CNBC (Jan. 11, 2019),  https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/11/why-
people-are-fleeing-new-jersey-more-than-any-other-state.html [https://perma.cc/YB5M-
VWX] (“New Jersey became the No. 1 state to move away from in 2018, according to new 
data from moving and relocation company United Vans Lines.”); Matt Vasilogambros, Why 
Are Residents Leaving in Illinois in Droves, GOVERNING (June 19, 2019, 8:39 AM), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/sl-illinois-sees-population-decline.html 
[https://perma.cc/H59R-URHW] (“Illinois’ population has declined by 157,000 residents 
over the past five years, making it one of only two states — West Virginia is the other — to 
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of the most common taxes is a property tax, because it is easy for a 
governor to place.130  However, it can have a stifling effect on the housing 
market in the respective area.131 
B. Pensions’ Investment Concerns 
Concerns about the risky investment portfolios of pensions that 
rely heavily on alternative investments have spanned at least two 
decades.132  In the early 2000s, pensions poured large amounts of money 
into hedge funds.133  In 2001, the Securities Exchange Commission 
issued a speech warning stating that pension plans’ movement into hedge 
funds, presents many reasons to be cautious.134  These investment 
concerns dealing with hedge fund investment included conflict of 
interest,135  lack of regulation,136 and lack of transparency.137 
 
lose people over the past decade.”); see also Elizabeth S. Goldman & Stewart E. Sterk, The 
Impact of Law on the State Pension Crisis, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 115 (2019) 
(“Because the population is mobile, a state whose tax burden becomes high relative to that of 
its neighbors risks losing those taxpayers in the best position to shoulder that burden.”). 
 130. See Greg Hinz, Pensions Sucking Up Half of Property Tax Hikes, CHI. BUS. (July 31, 
2008, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20180731/BLOGS02/180739969/pensions-
soaking-up-half-of-property-tax-hikes [https://perma.cc/7GXA-DDHW] (“[T]he cost of 
worker pensions is soaking up a larger and larger share of your property taxes, on average 45 
cents of every extra dollar levied by school districts, city halls and other local government 
statewide between 1996 and 2016.”). 
 131. See, e.g., A.K. Thompson, Property Taxes Stunt Chicago’s House Price Growth, FIN. 
TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/e579e7a2-9d88-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb 
[https://perma.cc/M52L-C3WA] (“[A]gents and brokers say the seemingly relentless increase 
in Chicago’s property taxes in recent years is one of several factors sucking dynamism from 
the market, which has long struggled to keep pace with other leading US metropolitan areas, 
such as New York and San Francisco.”). 
 132. Paul F. Royle, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Risks and 
Opportunities for Public Pension Plans, Keynote Address before the Public Funds Symposium 
(July 17, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch507.htm [https://perma.cc/L3AF-
9GD9]. 
 133. See, e.g., Justin Dini, Off the Beaten Track, INST. INV. MAG. (Apr. 30, 2001), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b15134g1jpzkpd/off-the-beaten-track 
[https://perma.cc/E59Q-R2EZ] (outlining the various pensions increasing investments in 
alternatives including, one of the largest, CalPERS). 
 134. Royle, supra note 132. 
 135. Id. (“[T]he nature of hedge fund investments and the relative lack of regulation 
mandates that you conduct adequate due diligence when considering these types of 
investments.”). 
 136. Id. (“Another problem is potential conflicts of interest. Consultants hired to identify 
hedge fund investments are sometimes involved on some level in servicing the hedge funds 
they promote.”). 
 137. Id. (“High debt and secrecy have become parts of the hedge fund culture. Many hedge 
fund managers make money because they are privy to information others do not have.”). 
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Some pensions have started to retreat from hedge funds,138  but 
from 2007 to 2017, alternative investments in pensions increased from 
making up 9% to 27% of total assets in public pension investment 
portfolios.139  Pension funds’ risky investments and behavior140 are 
largely attributed to the severity of their underfunding status and the 
persistence of low interest rates.141  The combination of both factors 
account for an estimated one-third of public pension funds’ total risk,142 
with nearly 12% due to underfunded status alone.143  
C.  The Legal Protections of Pensions 
As pensions are pushed towards insolvency by missed 
contributions, the fund’s obligations to current and future pensioners need 
to be restructured.144  Current pensioners, however, have significant 
protections that inhibit impairment of any future payments.145  There are 
four main types of protections given to enrolled pensioners among the 
states: (1) common-law contractual, (2) common-law contractual and 
state statutory; (3) state statutory; and (4) state constitutional.146  
 
 138. See, e.g., Rob Copeland, New Jersey Backs Away from Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 3, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-jersey-backs-away-from-hedge-
funds-1470264516 [https://perma.cc/2M89-WNB4] (“New Jersey’s move is an about-face for 
a state that had been one of the more enthusiastic proponents of hedge funds, scattering 
billions of dollars across managers . . . .  But the state’s hedge-fund investments collectively 
were down 3% through the end of May for the calendar year and 6% for the fiscal year.”). 
 139. Liz Farmer, Pensions Have Tripled Their Investment in High-Risk Assets. Is It Paying 
Off?,  GOVERNING (May 8, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-
public-pension-investment-returns-alternative.html [https://perma.cc/GJ23-FMGA]. 
 140. Risky investments and behavior are defined as a pension’s choice to invest in risky 
assets as a “reach-for-yield” that include investments such as real estate and hedge funds. Lu 
et al., supra note 17, at 1. 
 141. Id. (“We find that funds on average took more risk when risk-free rates and funding 
ratios were lower, which is consistent with both the funding ratio and the risk-premia 
channels.”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 37 (“On average across states, the risk component associated with underfunding 
represented about 12 percent of the total risk in 2016.”). 
 144. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369–70 (“If municipalities are going to solve 
their financial challenges, addressing these substantial pension liabilities in some fashion will 
be necessary.”). 
 145. See Diane L. Dick, Bondholders vs. Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies: The 
Political Economy of Chapter 9, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 73, 87 (2018) (“In effect, these legal 
protections mean that public pension plan sponsors are obligated to provide promised benefits 
whether or not they have adequately funded the plan, and regardless of how plan investments 
have performed.”). 
 146. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR STATE PENSION AND RETIREE 
HEALTH BENEFITS 3 (2019), 
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Michigan, New York, Illinois, Arizona, New Mexico, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas have state constitutional provisions which protect pension 
holders.147  These state protections should be a concern for investors 
because courts are unwilling to budge on the interpretation of pension 
impairments pre-bankruptcy.148 
Alternatively, when a state attempts to reform its pension system 
for future pensioners and fails, the outcome can tend to lower the credit 
rating of the state.149  This failure creates a snowball effect on the cost for 
future bond issuance because the lower credit rating increases the yield a 
state will be forced to pay on its bonds.150  The legal and political 
safeguards that both maintain pensioners’ benefits and stall reform for 
future pensioners are important factors to be weighed when investing in 
municipal bonds.151 
Nevertheless, pension reform is a necessary step to municipal 
health.152  It can look different depending on the state, but the trend seems 
to be similar to the corporate model.153  One example is in New Jersey, 
where Governor Stephen Sweeney proposes to allow pensioners to 
 
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2019/05/prs_legal_protections_for_state_and_local
_pension_and_retiree_medical_benefits_brief_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/46LV-VLYS] 
[hereinafter LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PENSIONS]. 
 147. Id. 
 148. On May 8, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a pension law 
meant to scale back pension benefits unconstitutional. See In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 
N.E.3d 1, 22 (“The General Assembly may find itself in crisis, but it is a crisis which other 
public pension systems managed to avoid and, as reflected in the SEC order, it is a crisis for 
which the General Assembly itself is largely responsible.”).  On December 3, 2018 the 
Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously struck down a pension law meant to reform pensions 
and lower cost striking a blow against the then-Governor attempt to address underfunded 
pension concerns. See Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Ky. 
2018); see also Dick, supra note 145, at 87 (“Public pensions are famously viewed as 
“untouchable” outside of bankruptcy.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Kelly Nolan, Illinois Dinged by Downgrade, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2013, 
7:03 PM) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578539701130962058 
[https://perma.cc/L5J6-9JJ3] (explaining when Illinois failed to pass pension overhaul both 
Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service cut the state’s rating on its GO Bonds). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Dick, supra note 145, at 87 (explaining how legal protections create an obligation 
for the city to pay into the plan regardless of any factor). 
 152. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 550–51 (“While the fate of public pensions in 
municipal bankruptcy is uncertain, the need for reform in the operation and protection of 
public pensions is clear from the growing number of cities with public pension crises.”). 
 153. Elizabeth Bauer, No, Public Pension Reform Experiments Have Not Failed, FORBES 
(Aug. 16, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ebauer/2019/08/16/no-public-
pension-reform-experiments-have-not-failed/#a303d4e5bf72 [https://perma.cc/55E6-LEU2] 
(explaining the states are experimenting with a “cash balance plan,” as they try to move away 
from traditional “defined-benefits” pension plans). 
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receive traditional pension benefits up to $40,000 of their salary.154  After 
this point, any additional earnings will be placed in a hybrid cash-balance 
savings plan, similar to a 401k,155 that would guarantee a 4% return for 
workers even if the investments perform worse.156  These types of 
proposals are crucial to solving mounting pension obligations in some 
states.157 
IV.  WHAT INVESTORS SHOULD LEARN FROM MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCIES 
To better appreciate the complete relationship between 
underfunded pension plans and municipal bond safety, investors must 
understand how pension obligations lead municipalities into default.158  
The two largest municipal bankruptcies—Detroit and Puerto Rico—
reveal red flags that investors should be aware of when buying municipal 
bonds and the settlement outcomes that undermine the safety of 
municipal bond investments.159 
A. Detroit 
Detroit’s bankruptcy came at a time when city pensions were $3.5 
billion underfunded.160  Detroit’s pension problem fermented over 
 
 154. Tony Howley, Sweeney’s Pension Proposal is What Our State Needs, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Aug. 17, 2019, 5:38 AM), 
https://www.northjersey.com/story/opinion/contributors/2019/08/17/sweeneys-pension-
proposal-what-nj-needs-howley/2030764001/ [https://perma.cc/7AWD-97VL]. 
 155. Id.; see Julia Kagan, 401(k) Plans: The Complete Guide, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/401kplan.asp [https://perma.cc/2D92-2GNB] (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2019)  (“A 401(k) plan is a tax-advantaged, defined-contribution retirement 
account offered by many employers to their employees.”). 
 156. Howley, supra note 154. 
 157. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 550–51 (“While the fate of public pensions in 
municipal bankruptcy is uncertain, the need for reform in the operation and protection of 
public pensions is clear from the growing number of cities with public pension crises.”). 
 158. See Dick, supra note 145, at 91 (explaining the role pensioners play in underfunded 
plans as they relate to bondholders). 
 159. See Matt Krantz, Detroit Bankruptcy Rattles Muni Bond Investors, USA TODAY (July 
19, 2013, 1:07 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2013/07/19/detroit-
muni-bond-investors/2568039 [https://perma.cc/G5ZE-QZ3H] (“Detroit’s bankruptcy 
protection filing is introducing the word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought 
shelter in the municipal bond market.”). 
 160. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 
109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 2-3, In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2013). 
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decades.161  Michigan’s constitutional amendment that protected 
payments to pensioners made it impossible for Detroit to reform how it 
paid pensioners who were already in the system.162  In 2005, Detroit 
issued $1.44 billion in 15-year, floating-rate quasi-POBs163 to fund the 
growing gap within the city’s pension funds for firefighters, police, and 
general employees.164  Once the financial crisis took its toll on pension 
accounts, the quasi-POB payments Detroit owed ballooned and continued 
to represent a substantial percentage of the city’s revenue.165 
In addition to Detroit’s increasing pension obligations, by 2011, 
Detroit had 100,000 vacant buildings, including homes and businesses.166  
The city lost one-quarter of its population over the decade.167  It was an 
unprecedented collapse of an American city, with 60% of its peak 
population gone.168  At the time, Detroit citizens faced one of the highest 
property tax burdens of any city.169  As the city neared bankruptcy in 
2012, it was considered, the most dangerous city in America for the fourth 
year in a row,.170  Detroit’s violent crime rate was five times the national 
 
 161. Dick, supra note 145, at 100 (“Like its bankrupt peer cities in California, Detroit’s 
major creditors included participants in the city’s almost entirely unfunded retiree health plan, 
participants in underfunded pension plans, and capital market creditors.”). 
 162. The Michigan Constitution states: “The accrued financial benefits of each pension 
plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual 
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” MICH. CONST. ART. IX, 
§ 24. 
 163. Dick, supra note 145, at 101 (explaining the bonds were called Certificate of 
Participation (“COP”) bonds but functioned the same way as POBs. Detroit could not issue 
POBs to shore up its pension fund because it had reached its constitutional debt limit.  
Therefore, it issued these COPs to “sidestep” laws enabling it to not call the issued bonds debt 
on its balance sheet.). 
 164. Id. at 100–01. 
 165. CITY OF DET.., PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 27–28 (2013), 
https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/2018-
05/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/429Z-
6LHQ] (outlining the City of Detroit’s large, pre-petition, COP liabilities by 2013). 
 166. Monica Davey, The Odd Challenges for Detroit Planners, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/us/06detroit.html [https://perma.cc/XH2N-GWSV]. 
 167. Scott Martelle, The Collapse of Detroit, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2011-mar-27-la-oe-martelle-detroit-20110327-
story.html [https://perma.cc/UD7Y-NM6U]. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of the City of Detroit, Michigan’s 
Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 4–5, In re 
City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013). 
 170. Daniel Fisher, Detroit Tops the 2012 List of America’s Most Dangerous Cities, 
FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:26 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/10/18/detroit-tops-the-2012-list-of-
americas-most-dangerous-cities/#401eef3c2931 [https://perma.cc/CTE3-HA4V]. 
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average.171  Nevertheless, the police force had let go of 200 officers, 
nearly 10% of its total force,172 and the fire department lost fourteen of 
its firefighting engines.173  With citizens feeling unsafe in their own 
homes174 and police officers holding an “Enter At Your Own Risk” 
rally,175 Detroit had no choice but to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy on July 
18, 2013.176 
B. Puerto Rico 
Puerto Rico also experienced a huge pension crisis.177  In 2016, 
Puerto Rico had $2 billion in assets among its pension funds compared to 
$45 billion in pension liabilities.178  Residents left Puerto Rico in record 
amounts, shrinking a tax base necessary to cover the territory’s growing 
obligations.179  On July 1, 2016, Puerto Rico declared its intention to 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. (stating that the City of Detroit cut some 200 officers from its 2500 strong 
police force). 
 173. Rod Meloni, Detroit Fire Department Is Forced to Make Big Cuts, Eliminating 
Several Engine, Ladder Companies, CLICKONDETROIT (July 2, 2012, 11:14 PM), 
https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/2012/07/03/detroit-fire-department-is-forced-to-
make-big-cuts-eliminating-several-engine-ladder-companies/ [https://perma.cc/EQ2H-
36NF]. 
 174. Id. (noting that one citizen stated “I’m constantly on guard here due to the fact that 
police aren’t what they should be, the Fire Department is not what it should be”). 
 175. Enter at Your Own Risk: Police Union Says ‘War-Like’ Detroit is Unsafe for Visitors, 
CBS DET. (Oct. 6, 2012, 11:57 AM), https://detroit.cbslocal.com/2012/10/06/enter-at-your-
own-risk-police-union-says-war-like-detroit-is-unsafe-for-visitors/ [https://perma.cc/V227-
7KM4]. 
 176. Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013); see Monica Davey & Mary Walsh, Billions in Debt, 
Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html 
[https://perma.cc/SFV2-7PL2] (“Detroit, the cradle of America’s automobile industry and 
once the nation’s fourth-most-populous city, filed for bankruptcy on Thursday, the largest 
American city ever to take such a course.”). 
 177. See Nick Brown, Puerto Rico’s Other Crisis; Impoverished Pensions, REUTERS (Apr. 
7, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-puertorico-
pensions/ [https://perma.cc/6NE4-3HH9] (explaining Puerto Rico’s pension crisis 
perpetuated by leaders characterized as “eternal optimists”). 
 178. Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico’s Pensions: $2 Billion in Assets, $45 Billion in 
Liabilities, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2016, 4:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-ricos-
pensions-2-billion-in-assets-45-billion-in-liabilities-1472156434 [https://perma.cc/A9MT-
3WFP]. 
 179. See Alan Yuhas, Economic Exodus Means Two-Thirds of Puerto Ricans May Soon 
Live in States, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2015, 7:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/puerto-rico-economy-exodus-us-mainland 
[https://perma.cc/5QGQ-WZU4] (“Facing a crisis of monumental proportions at home, tens 
294 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 24 
default on its GO bonds for the first time.180  Puerto Rico’s then-Governor 
Ricardo Nevares argued that funding teachers, emergency personnel, and 
other critical functions should take priority over Puerto Rico’s obligation 
to its bondholders.181  The night before Puerto Rico declared it was going 
to default, then-President Barack Obama signed the Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”).,182 
which allowed the island to stop making payments to its bondholders. 183  
PROMESA created a committee to oversee the restructuring of all of 
Puerto Rico’s debt.184 
Shortly after PROMESA was formed, a 10-year-old boy was shot 
in the head near the pool of a  popular hotel in Puerto Rico,185 casting 
light on the high crime rate the territory was facing.186  Puerto Rico had 
seen massive layoffs to teachers, police, and firefighters over the prior 
years.187  By 2017, Puerto Rico’s underfunded pensions increased to $50 
billion, and its total debt was $74 billion.188  With no possible way to 
 
of thousands of people are fleeing a Caribbean island in search of a better life in the United 
States.”). 
 180. Heather Long. Puerto Rico Makes Historic Default, CNN (July 1, 2016, 3:05 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2016/07/01/investing/puerto-rico-defaults-general-obligation-
bonds/index.html [https://perma.cc/G72G-4A5J]. 
 181. See id. (“This administration continues to take historic steps to ensure the residents 
of Puerto Rico continue to receive essential services while the commonwealth continues to 
face a delicate financial situation,’ a spokesman said.”). 
 182. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), 
Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2101 (2018)); see also Nick 
Timiraos & Bryan Tau, President Obama Signs Puerto Rico Debt-Relief Bill, WALL ST. J. 
(June 30, 2016, 5:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-obama-signs-puerto-rico-
debt-relief-bill-1467321998?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/SD6Q-44KB] (explaining 
the actions of the White House and what the Debt Relief bill would mean for Puerto Rico). 
 183. Timiraos & Tau, supra note 182. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Child Killed at Puerto Rico Sparks Concerns over Rising Murder Rate, GUARDIAN 
(July 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05/puerto-rico-hotel-child-
murder-rate [https://perma.cc/VHK2-CSJD]. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Michael A. Fletcher, Already Deep in Debt, Puerto Rico Now Faces a New Crisis, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/26/already-deep-
in-debt-puerto-rico-now-faces-a-new-crisis/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/L9RN-8CT5] 
(explaining the looming collapse of the island’s healthcare system); Alan Yuhas, Economic 
Exodus Means Two-Thirds of Puerto Ricans May Soon Live in States, THE GUARDIAN (July 
2, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/puerto-rico-economy-
exodus-us-mainland [https://perma.cc/4D5H-XHUR] (“Unable to pay its $73bn debt, Puerto 
Rico has begun closing schools and watching its healthcare system collapse and 45% of its 
people living in poverty.”). 
 188. Martin Z. Braun & Johnathan Levin, Debt Island: How $74 Billion in Bonds 
Bankrupted Puerto Rico, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
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continue to maintain public services, pension payments, and bond 
payments, Puerto Rico’s then-Governor filed for bankruptcy on May 2, 
2017.189 
C.  Bondholders in Bankruptcy 
For bondholders, the primary lesson of Detroit and Puerto Rico’s 
bankruptcy was that pensioners come before bondholders, and Wall 
Street loses.190  In Detroit, Federal Court Judge Steven Rhodes showed 
concern for pension holders when making his final ruling: “[the] court 
emphasizes that it will not lightly or casually exercise the power under 
federal bankruptcy law to impair pensions.”191  In Detroit’s final 
settlement, pensioners received at least 60% of their pensions owed,192 
with no more than 4.5% individual cuts to city retirees.193  In contrast, 
 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/debt-island-how-74-billion-in-
bonds-bankrupted-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/ULL3-7WJY]. 
 189. Letter to Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. to Restructure Debts under Title III of 
PROMESA (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3696507/Puerto-Rico-s-
Letter-on-Debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFT2-FJWU]; see Heather Long, Puerto Rico Files for 
Biggest US Municipal Bankruptcy, CNN (May 3, 2017, 2:50 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/news/economy/puerto-rico-wants-to-file-for-
bankruptcy/index.html [https://perma.cc/P64P-GWXF] (“It’s the biggest municipal 
bankruptcy filing ever in the US. Puerto Rico currently owes its creditors a whopping $70 
billion, far higher than Detroit’s $18 billion bankruptcy in 2013.”). 
 190. See Michael Aneiro, Seven Lessons from Detroit’s Bankruptcy for Muni Investors, 
BARRONS (Oct. 24, 2014, 4:42 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/seven-lessons-from-
detroits-bankruptcy-for-muni-investors-1414183339 [https://perma.cc/3HPK-9KBS]. 
 191. Michigan pension holders are protected by a clause in their state constitution. MICH. 
CONST. ART. IX, § 24. As part of Detroit’s initial bankruptcy filing was a plan to cut pension 
payments, and the Ingham County Circuit court initially ruled that cutting pensions was a 
violation of the State’s constitution. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, Webster v. State, No. 13-734-
CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 18, 2013). Although in Federal Bankruptcy Court, Judge Rhodes 
allowed the pension cuts holding that “accrued benefits” were not protected, because federal 
bankruptcy court, preempts state court’s jurisdiction. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 
97, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also David A. Skeel, 
Jr., The Education of Detroit’s Pension and Bond Creditors, 2 PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y 
INITIATIVE 1, 3 (2014),  http:// publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/166-a 
[https://perma.cc/QG9H-BG8G] (“Because the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to 
enact bankruptcy laws, and the municipal bankruptcy law that Congress has enacted permits 
a city to restructure its ordinary debts, the unfunded portion of a pension can be restructured 
even if state law seems to say pensions are sacrosanct.”). 
 192. David Skeel, Fixing Puerto Rico’s Debt Mess, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Jan. 15, 2016, 
7:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fixing-puerto-ricos-debt-mess-
1452040144?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/VVE7-3NK9]. 
 193. Aneiro, supra note 190 (“[Bank of America] notes that city pensioners were 
minimally impaired, with cuts of no more than 4.5% and the elimination of annual COLA 
increases.”). 
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Detroit’s GO bondholders received only 41% of their owed 
obligations.194 
In Puerto Rico, under the bankruptcy settlement, 61% of retirees 
would see no reduction in their pensions,195 and cuts to monthly pensions 
totaling more than $1,200 would be capped at 8.5%.196  However, GO 
bondholders received just 55% of their investment back,197 causing a 
downgrade for GO bonds in Puerto Rico.198  The outcome of both 
settlements reflects the unequal displacement of the payback to 
bondholders and pensioners, which legally had the “same priority.”199  
This preference is largely due to politicians who, when deciding 
settlements, place a higher value on pensioners than bondholders.200 
Not only did bondholders receive a smaller percentage of their 
claims than pensioners, but the underlying safeguards for some of their 
bonds also changed during Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy.201  In particular, 
the bankruptcy completely shifted the market’s understanding of how 
 
 194. Skeel, supra note 192. 
 195. Karen Pierog, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Reaches Deal over Retiree Pensions, 
REUTERS (July 12, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
puertorico/puerto-rico-oversight-board-reaches-deal-over-retiree-pensions-
idUSKCN1TD2RZ [https://perma.cc/SXC9-QRWZ]. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Notice to Shareholders,  Recent Dev. Highlights Pertaining to the Commonwealth of 
P.R and the UBS and P.R. Inv’rs Families of Funds (Each, a “Fund” and Collectively, the 
“Funds”), UBS  (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.ubs.com/us/en/wealth-
management/information/puerto-rico-
funds/_jcr_content/rightpar/innergrid/xcol1/teaser/linklist/link.0689094754.file/bGluay9wY
XRoPS9jb250ZW50L2RhbS9hc3NldHMvd21hL3ByL2RvYy9jb21tb253ZWFsdGgtcHJvb
WVzYS11cGRhdGUtMDgyMzE5LnBkZg==/commonwealth-promesa-update-082319.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AP3Q-9W5H] (“Fitch Ratings (‘Fitch’), Moody’s Investors Service 
(‘Moody’s’), and S&P Global Ratings (‘S&P’) have downgraded the general obligation bonds 
(‘GOs’) of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as well as the obligations of certain 
Commonwealth agencies and public corporations.”). 
 199. Skeel, supra note 192. 
 200. See In re City of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), aff’d in 
part, 542 B.R. 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). (In Stockton, California bankruptcy, the judge 
allowed pensions to be modified.  In an oral opinion, the judge said the California Public 
Employee’s Retirement System “has bullied its way about in this case with an iron fist 
insisting it and the municipal pensions it services are inviolable.  The bully may have an iron 
fist, but it also turns out to have a glass jaw.”); Although, the pressure from CALPERS made 
the politicians decide not to reduce pensions at all, and the bondholders took most of the cuts. 
Marc Lifsher & Melody Petersen, Judge Approves Stockton Bankruptcy Plan; Worker 
Pensions Safe, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
stockton-pension-court-ruling-cuts-20141029-story.html [https://perma.cc/5LUT-ZMW5]. 
 201. Alexandra Scaggs, Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Case Casts a Shadow on Billions in 
Municipal Bonds, BARRONS (May 23, 2019, 9:48 AM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/municipal-special-revenue-bonds-review-court-ruling-
puerto-rico-chicago-51558554529 [https://perma.cc/85YU-JA8D]. 
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special revenue bonds are viewed during a municipality’s bankruptcy.202  
Before Puerto Rico’s insolvency, special revenue bonds were 
continuously paid out by a municipality during the bankruptcy period.203  
This changed when the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the special 
revenue bondholders relief during bankruptcy, calling continued 
payments permitted but not required.204  On July 31, 2019, the First 
Circuit denied rehearsing en banc and issued an opinion affirming its 
holding on special revenue bonds.205  The impact of Puerto Rico’s 
bankruptcy on the safety of special revenue bonds206 caused rating 
agencies to review their grades on special revenue bonds for potential 
downgrades.207 
D.  Warnings for Municipal Bond Investors from Municipal 
Bankruptcies 
The bankruptcies of Detroit and Puerto Rico reveal two 
overarching themes:208 first, the red flags investors should look out for 
when determining the risk for an investment in municipal bonds;209 and 
second, the underlying preferential treatment for pensioners over 
bondholders in bankruptcy settlements.210 
The red flags an investor should look for before investing in 
municipal bonds become apparent as a municipality nears closer to 
default.211  A state or local government with a high underfunded pension 
liability leads to a decreasing population, an increasing tax, and 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 919 F.3d 121, 132 (1st Cir. 2019) (“In 
sum, Sections 928(a) and 922(d) permit, but do not require, continued payment during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
 205. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 931 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2019) 
(“Section 922(d) commands that “application of pledged special revenues” be done in a 
manner “consistent” with section 928—which in turn provides that liens on special revenues 
“shall be subject to the necessary operating expenses” of the project or system.”); see also 
Assured Guar. Corp. v. Fin. Oversight Bd., No. 19-391, 2020 WL 129573, at  (U.S. Jan. 13, 
2020) (indicating the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on the case). 
 206. See Sasseen, supra note 38 (explaining the uncertainty and fear Puerto Rico has 
caused the municipal bond market as it relates to special revenue bonds.). 
 207. Scaggs, supra note 201 (explaining that Moody’s is reviewing “$14 billion of 
municipal special-revenue bonds and that Fitch is reviewing “seven series of special-revenue 
bonds” in response to Puerto Rico ruling). 
 208. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 209. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 210. See supra Part IV.C. 
 211. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
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increasing crime rate, all accompanied by decreasing coverage of 
essential services.212  The red flag—a decline in essential services—is 
critical to the likelihood of a municipal bond default.213  In Detroit’s 
bankruptcy hearing in 2013, when weighing whether or not to approve 
Detroit’s Chapter 9 filing,  Judge Rhodes stated: “It is the City’s service 
delivery insolvency that the Court finds most strikingly disturbing in this 
case.”214  In another hearing in 2014, Judge Rhodes stated: “[The service 
insolvency] is inhumane and intolerable, and it must be fixed.”215  When 
these red flags are present and eventually present themselves as unmet 
essential services, the chance of a municipality bankruptcy filing 
occurring and being accepted rises.216  The length of such bankruptcy 
may depend on the municipality’s ability to right its essential services.217 
The second theme, preference for pensioners, has been evident 
through the outcomes in municipal bankruptcy cases.218  Investors should 
heed this risk of being subordinated in payout preference as they were in 
Detroit and Puerto Rico.219  When a municipality defaults, investors will 
not come out whole, and the protections their bonds allegedly have and 
payments they expect could continue to change as more defaults occur in 
the future.220 
 
 212. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 102 (explaining Illinois state mandate to increase its 
funding for pensions has caused municipal bond rating downgrades as well as cuts to essential 
services). 
 213. Stephen Fehr, ‘Service-Delivery Insolvency’ is Changing Municipal Bankruptcy, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/23/service-delivery-insolvency-is-changing-municipal-
bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/F7LQ-EF7E]. 
 214. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also 
Fehr, supra note 213 (“Neither city could pay their unsustainable debts, but officials’ failure 
to curb violent crime, spreading blight and decaying infrastructure was even more compelling 
to the federal bankruptcy judges who decided that Stockton and Detroit were eligible to file 
for Chapter 9.”). 
 215. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 262 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 216. See Fehr, supra note 213 (stating that service insolvency is a persuasive factor for a 
judge in allowing a municipality to successfully file for bankruptcy). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Dick, supra note 145, at 77 (“Many chapter 9 debtors have simply chosen to be 
more generous to their employees and retirees, even if it requires cramming down a plan that 
severely impairs the rights of other creditors.”). 
 219. See supra Part IV. A-B; see also Skeel, supra note 192 (“Bankruptcy can work, but 
bankruptcy laws need to be changed to ensure fair treatment of creditors.”). 
 220. See Krantz, supra note 159 (“Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the 
word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond 
market.”). 
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V.  HOW MUNICIPALITIES PITCH INVESTORS 
Like Detroit and Puerto Rico, some states face major pension 
problems.221  Two states in particular, New Jersey and Illinois, are 
currently showing red flags that should concern investors about their 
municipal bond holdings.222  These states are experiencing budget 
deficits, vendor defaults, and troubling cuts to necessary public services 
in order to pay for pension liabilities.223 
A. The Struggling States with the Highest Pension Obligations 
In 2019, Illinois had the worst fiscal health of any state.224  
Further, Illinois is ranked as the third-worst state in its pension plan 
funding percentage,225 while holding the nation’s largest pension debt.226  
Illinois’s adjusted net pension liability is $240.8 billion as of June 2018, 
which is five times the total state revenue.227  On top of its pension 
 
 221. See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in 
Municipal Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 34 (2017) (“As more municipalities are 
sinking into financial distress, weighed down in large part by unsustainable legacy costs, there 
have been an unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcy filings.”); see also T. Leigh 
Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen E. Lahey, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 12 (2014) (“Even with an optimistic rate of return on pension fund investments, 
projections estimate that plans in seven states will be insolvent by 2020 and plans in half the 
states will be broke by 2027.”). 
 222. See Michael Cembalest, J.P. MORGAN PRIVATE BANK, THE ARC AND THE COVENANTS 
4.0 2, https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320746272624.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TBS-
6C53] (“Illinois and New Jersey come closest in my view to deteriorations in pension finances 
that are practically irreversible.”). 
 223. See Adam Schuster, Illinois Public Services Being Cut to Pay Unsustainable Pension 
Cost, ILLINOIS POL’Y, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/illinois-public-services-being-
cut-to-pay-unsustainable-pension-cost/ [https://perma.cc/M8HS-YF8B] (last visited Dec. 26, 
2019) (“Public pensions are already eating away Illinois government services, increasing by 
more than 500% during the past 20 years as spending on core services including child 
protection, state police and college money for poor students has dropped by nearly one-third 
since 2000.”). 
 224. Olivia Gonzalez, Ranking the States by Fiscal Condition: Illinois, MERCATUS CTR. 
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/50-ranking-states-fiscal-condition-
illinois [https://perma.cc/VJ36-K297] (“Illinois performs poorly on just about every metric 
that goes into calculating its overall rank.”). 
 225. By the numbers: Illinois ranks 3rd worst on pension plan funding, CTR. SQUARE (Sept. 
6, 2019), https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/by-the-numbers-illinois-ranks-rd-worst-
on-pension-plan/article_16e71256-cf2f-11e9-9586-fbb02740d006.html 
[https://perma.cc/W88P-W32F]. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Pisea Chea, Research Announcement: Moody’s- US States’ Pension Liabilities Fall 
in Fiscal 2018 amid Higher Investment Returns, MOODY’S INVS. SERVS. (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://m.moodys.com/research/Moodys-US-states-pension-liabilities-fall-in-fiscal-2018-
amid—PBM_1195186 [https://perma.cc/8ZLR-MSM2]. Other sources state the pension 
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liability, the state has $25.8 billion in POBs outstanding.228  By 2020, 
Illinois’s required contributions to pensions will total $9.3 billion, one-
quarter of Illinois’ general funds budget.229  Illinois likely has three 
options to begin to fill the underfunded gap: (1) a 25% tax hike; (2) a 
689% increase in contributions; or (3) an 11.9 % assumed rate of 
return.230 
In some of Illinois’s cities, pensions have become so underfunded 
that the worst-off pensions are allowed to compel the state Comptroller 
to withhold tax revenue from municipalities and reallocate that revenue 
to their cities’ pension plans.231  This pension-intercept law232 has 
 
liability for Illinois at 137.3 billion at the end of fiscal 2019. Illinois’ Unfunded Pension 
Liability Rises to $137.3 Billion, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2019, 6:37 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-pensions/illinois-unfunded-pension-liability-
rises-to-137-3-billion-idUSKBN1Y82ZP [https://perma.cc/Z7UY-PA5D].  The “real” 
number is likely somewhere in between depending on one’s discount rate chosen.  See 
Thomas J. Healey, Commentary, A Note on the Discount Rate, PENSIONS & INVS. (Oct. 8, 
2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/industry-voices/commentary-note-discount-rate 
[https://perma.cc/F7A4-4AQZ] (“Using expected future return on assets, the total liability of 
U.S. state pension plans is about $1.4 trillion (according to the Pew Charitable Trusts), while 
utilizing a risk-free rate of 2% yields a liability estimate of more than $4 trillion (according 
to the American Legislative Exchange Council as well Moody’s Investors Service). Again, 
the average 10-year return as of June 30, 2018, for the country’s three largest public plans 
was 5%.”). 
 228. Illinois’ Pension Bonds: The Other $26 Billion Obligation You Shouldn’t Ignore, ILL. 
POL’Y https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/illinois-pension-bonds-the-other-26-billion-
obligation-you-shouldnt-ignore/ [https://perma.cc/2WD8-QPAQ] (last visited Dec. 19, 
2019); see also Statement No. 27 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, supra 
note 97 (“The ARC does not include payments of pension-related debt. Therefore, those 
payments should not be included in annual pension cost.”). 
 229. Dan Hynes, DIGGING OUT: THE RAUNER WRECKAGE REPORT 7, (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www2.illinois.gov/IISNews/19698-Digging_Out_-
_The_Rauner_Wreckage_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/653T-7859] (“The state’s largest 
obligation, pensions, continues to take up a greater and greater share of the state budget.”). 
 230. Cembalest, supra note 222, at 2; see also Natasha Frost, US States Hope Legalization 
of Weed Will Solve Their Pension Crisis, QUARTZ (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1493246/illinois-new-jersey-look-at-legalized-weed-to-fund-pension-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/JU8F-WN5J] (explaining that some states are looking to marijuana 
legalization as a way to help their pensions funds). 
 231. Caitlin Devitt, Intercept Law Puts Distressed Illinois Cities in the Crosshairs for 
Added Oversight, FORBES (May 1, 2018, 2:04 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debtwire/2018/05/01/new-pension-intercept-law-puts-
distressed-illinois-cities-in-the-crosshairs-for-added-oversight/#6384a9fa61d7 
[https://perma.cc/M68F-MWTX]. 
 232. Public Act 1495, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016); see also Amanda Kass & 
Andrew Crosby, LIFE PRESERVERS OR ANCHORS? AN EXAMINATION OF STATE INTERVENTION 
IN MUNICIPAL PENSION FUNDING IN ILLINOIS 1, GOV. FIN. RES. CTR. (July 2019), 
https://gfrc.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/188/2019/07/2019July_Life-Preservers-or-
Anchors.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQJ3-TSC2] (“Starting in fiscal year (FY) 2016, the 
enforcement mechanism allows the State Comptroller to intercept state sharing revenue if 
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wreaked havoc on Illinois’ struggling cities as near depleted pensions 
intercept city revenues that would normally go toward essential services 
and payroll.233  With pensions in Illinois wavering at 35% funded,234 the 
intercept law has been used by pension funds in the cities of Harvey, 
North Chicago, Chicago, and East St. Louis.235  What was meant to hold 
municipalities accountable for underpaying their pension plans has 
caused these cities to become more cash-strapped and fiscally insolvent 
than ever before.236 
Similarly, New Jersey has $239 billion of outstanding and 
anticipated debt.237  Of that debt, $45.16 billion is in municipal bonds, 
and the state needs $115 billion to cover future outstanding payments to 
the state pension fund.238  Taxpayers are expected to be burdened by 
$99.6 billion to support the underfunded public pension system in the 
state.239  New Jersey would have to raise its contributions by 521% or 
increase its tax revenues by 22% to begin to close the underfunded gap—
but the vital change has yet to occur.240  The Governor of New Jersey, 
Phil Murphy, expects to make pension contributions of only 70% of the 
 
municipalities’ contributions to their police and fire pension funds fall short of what their 
contributions are supposed to be under state law.”). 
 233. See, e.g., KASS & CROSBY, supra note 232, at 1 (“Harvey finds itself pushed to the 
brink by a new law that allows pension funds to compel the state Comptroller to withhold 
state tax revenue that traditionally would go to the city.”). 
 234. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017 4 (June 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LB4M-CMCY]. 
 235. See Yvette Shields, Chicago Loses First Round in Pension Fund Intercept Litigation, 
BOND BUYER (June 7, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/chicago-loses-
first-round-in-pension-fund-intercept-litigation [https://perma.cc/CGD4-U69Q] (explaining a 
Chicago firefighter pension fund filed a $24 million claim for their pension funded at 26.5%); 
Yvette Shields, Cash-Strapped East St. Louis Joins Illinois Pension Intercept Illinois, 
FIDELITY.COM (Sept. 19, 2019, 5:03 PM), 
https://fixedincome.fidelity.com/ftgw/fi/FINewsArticle?id=201909191703SM______BND
BUYER_0000016d-4ad5-d046-a3fd-cff7c3af0000_110.1 [https://perma.cc/2EU5-HTFD] 
(explaining that the East St. Louis Firefighters submitting a pension intercept request of 2.2. 
million to the comptroller as their pension is only 11% funded). 
 236. Frank Shafroth, The Fiscal Firebomb Looming for Small Cities in Illinois, 
GOVERNING (July 2018), https://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/gov-illinois-
pensions.html [https://perma.cc/JM4X-LHFP] (“A state law meant to hold municipalities 
accountable for pension payments may actually worsen a coming fiscal crisis.”). 
 237. Ashley Balcerzak, How Deep Is NJ in Debt? Very, Very Deep but Not as Bad as 2017, 
USA TODAY (June 3, 2019, 6:04 AM), 
https://www.northjersey.com/story/money/2019/06/03/new-jersey-state-debt-report-
analysis/1301540001/ [https://perma.cc/MV4H-TSZA]. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Cembalest, supra note 222. 
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recommended ARC amount each year241 and by 2023 pay the full 
recommended amount.242  This promise came after Governor Murphy 
raised the assumed rate of return for New Jersey pensions243 after then-
governor Chris Christie’s office previously lowered the return rate to 
reflect a more realistic assumption.244  Murphy’s action has allowed the 
state’s pension funds to appear healthier and, in turn, has lowered the 
state’s contributions.245   
Both Illinois and New Jersey’s pension obligations are massive 
and they alone cause concern for the future viability of the states.246  
However, just as in Detroit and Puerto Rico, the pension obligations are 
one piece of a larger puzzle.247  Pension viability does not tell the full 
story of what is going on inside these states.248  To view the other red 
flags pointing towards bankruptcy, all an investor must do is look closely 
at cities within the two states.249 
B. The Reality Facing Citizens in Illinois and New Jersey 
In Harvey, Illinois, employees in City Hall were left without air 
conditioning and threatened to leave work, citing unbearable conditions 
 
 241. Balcerzak, supra note 237. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Christian Hetrick, Phil Murphy Reverses Chris Christie’s Change to Pension System, 
OBSERVER.COM (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:21 PM), https://observer.com/2018/03/murphy-reverses-
christie-pension-system-change/ [https://perma.cc/54VN-EARY] (“Gov. Phil Murphy’s 
administration reversed a change made by Chris Christie to New Jersey’s pension system that 
would have forced state and local governments to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more 
into the ailing pension system next year.”). 
 244. Robert Snyder, New Jersey Lowers Assumed Rate of Return to 7%, PENSIONS & INVS. 
(Dec. 21, 2017, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20171221/ONLINE/171229973/new-jersey-lowers-
assumed-rate-of-return-to-7 [https://perma.cc/LMB7-TQ36] (“The New Jersey Pension 
Fund’s assumed rate of return has been reduced to 7% from 7.65% by state Treasurer Ford 
M. Scudder, the second rate cut he has enacted this year.”). 
 245. Hilary Russ, New Jersey Treasurer Resets Public Pension Rate of Return, REUTERS 
(Mar. 1 , 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-jersey-pensions/new-
jersey-treasurer-resets-public-pension-rate-of-return-idUSKCN1GD6MF 
[https://perma.cc/A5T4-4TAN] (“The switch to a higher assumed rate means that the state, 
and participating local governments in New Jersey, will for now escape the higher costs that 
arise when investment return assumptions are lowered.”). 
 246. Cembalest, supra note 222, at 2. 
 247. See supra Part III.C. 
 248. Shafroth, supra note 236. 
 249. See id. (explaining the fiscal trouble facing smaller cities in Illinois). 
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because the city failed to pay its electricity bill on time.250  On another 
occasion, the non-emergency 911 number was cut off for three days 
because the city was $14,000 in arrears on its phone bill, leaving citizens 
and possible alarm systems calling for help with no response.251  Even 
one of Harvey’s trash vendors allegedly demanded a check in full on the 
steps of City Hall to continue services.252 
In concurrence with vendor defaults,253 massive layoffs continue 
to occur in Harvey each year.254  In 2018, due to a successful pension 
intercept request from the Harvey’s firefighter pension plan,255 forty 
police and fire employees were let go, representing nearly half of 
Harvey’s force.256  Therefore, Harvey’s firefighters’ attempt to secure 
their pensions resulted in  a significant amount of firefighters in the 
department being fired.257  All the while, Harvey maintains one of the 
highest per capita crime rates in the state.258  Furthermore, Harvey’s 
citizens face unbearable tax hikes, represented by approximately 4,000 
outstanding property tax bills.259  Harvey has even defaulted on GO 
bonds multiple times during the past three years.260  Even so, the city 
 
 250. Zak Koeske Harvey Officials Are Scrambling After Police and Fire Non-emergency 
Phone Lines were Disconnected for Nonpayment, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2019, 12:08 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-harvey-phone-line-
disconnection-st-0825-20190823-j6sncdhz5rhbtfmkfqx7rxfyp4-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/736E-FYXQ]. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Zak Koeske, Harvey Lays off 40 Police and Fire Employees, Union Officials Say, 
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-
southtown/ct-sta-harvey-layoffs-st-0411-story.html [https://perma.cc/D25X-R6S9]. 
 255. Zak Koeske, Harvey Reaches Pension Fund Repayment Agreement; State to Cease 
Witholding Tax Revenues, CHI. TRIB. (July 24, 2018), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-harvey-pension-agreement-
st-0725-story.html [https://perma.cc/2TUS-SV3H] (“Harvey City Council unanimously 
approved a repayment agreement Monday with its police and fire pension funds, effectively 
resolving a months-long dispute over withheld state tax revenues that Harvey claimed had 
placed it on the brink of financial collapse and forced it to lay off 40 public safety workers.”). 
 256. Koeske, supra note 250. 
 257. Id. 
 258. John Dodge, The 10 ‘Most Dangerous’ Towns in Illinois, CBSCHICAGO (Dec. 16, 
2014, 12:11 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/12/16/the-10-most-dangerous-towns-in-
illinois/ [https://perma.cc/RJS6-N7JU]. 
 259. Shafroth, supra note 236. 
 260. The Editorial Board, Have We Got a Muni Bond for You, WALL ST. J: OPINION (May 
10, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/have-we-got-a-muni-bond-for-you-
1525993374 [https://perma.cc/33DM-C54L] (“Harvey has already defaulted on eight debt 
service payments over the past two years.”). 
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cannot seek bankruptcy without permission from the state, leaving it with 
insurmountable obligations and declining revenues.261 
Similarly situated to Harvey, is Camden, New Jersey, where the 
Camden’s School District plans to close schools and layoff 
approximately 300 teachers,262 as the city faced a $27 million budget 
deficit in 2019. 263  Since 2016, the city has suffered a “dirty water 
problem”264 with lead leaking into the city’s public water and the cost of 
repair too high to afford.265  Schools have been forced to include a special 
line in their budget for water coolers and paper cups each year to provide 
clean water.266  Despite having one of the worst murder rates in 
America,267 police layoffs have occurred sharply in the past in 
Camden.268 
All the red flags of prior bankruptcies currently exist in Illinois 
and New Jersey today, and there is no easy solution.269  The conditions 
in Harvey and Camden reflect the conditions in many cities in Illinois, 
New Jersey, and other underfunded states that are forced to make cuts to 
 
 261. Id. (“Under Illinois law, cities cannot file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, which provides 
a venue for impairing contracts.”). 
 262. David Madden, Camden Teachers Union: School Closings and Cuts Could be 
Coming, KYW NEWSRADIO (Apr. 9, 2019, 5:04 PM), 
https://kywnewsradio.radio.com/articles/news/camden-teachers-union-school-closings-and-
cuts-could-be-coming [https://perma.cc/F5R9-U9LP]. 
 263. See Stephen Danley, The Camden Education Crisis We All Knew was Coming, 
RUTGERS U.CAMDEN: LOC. KNOWLEDGE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://danley.camden.rutgers.edu/2019/04/03/the-camden-education-crisis-we-all-knew-
was-coming/ [https://perma.cc/K5EZ-TFQH] (explaining the 27-million-dollar deficit is the 
start of “financial crisis” for the school district). 
 264. Greg Adomaitis, How 1 N.J. District Has Beaten its Dirty Water Problem— for 14 
years, NJ.COM (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.nj.com/camden/2016/03/this_nj_citys_school_water_crisis_predates_newark.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/7NDQ-CPW5]. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Mike Maciag, Why Camden, N.J., the Murder Capital of the Country, Disbanded Its 
Police Force, GOVERNING (June 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-
safety/gov-camden-disbands-police-force-for-new-department.html 
[https://perma.cc/AG8Q-E7CD]. 
 268. See Jason Laday, Camden Police Layoff Plan Approved by State, Layoffs to Begin 
April 30, NJ.COM (Jan. 2, 2013), https://www.nj.com/gloucester-
county/2013/01/state_approves_camden_police_l.html [https://perma.cc/7A4M-7MNQ] 
(explaining in 2013, 265 police officers lost their jobs). 
 269. See Matt Egan, How Illinois became America’s Most Messed-Up State, 
CNNBUSINESS (July 1, 2017, 8:51 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/29/investing/illinois-budget-crisis-downgrade/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/HM3J-X2FP] (explaining Illinois’ low bond rating and pension liabilities 
“signals a heightened risk of default”). 
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essential services to meet obligations for pension funds.270  While 
politicians are making efforts to close the underfunded pension gap,271 if 
the economy falls into a recession, it is hard to imagine how New Jersey 
or Illinois will be able to handle their obligations as cities within the states 
are already essentially bankrupt.272  Defaults have significant 
consequences for municipal bond investors, and if municipalities in New 
Jersey or Illinois file for bankruptcy, the cumulative effect on the market 
could be significant.273 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Underfunded pensions diminish the safety of investments in 
municipal bonds in part because they lead to a lower prioritization for 
bondholders should the municipality file for bankruptcy.274  As pensions 
are increasingly underfunded, ratings are lowered for the municipality’s 
bonds,275 creating higher interest rates for any debt issued by the 
municipality.276  The higher interest rate means the municipality’s debt 
 
 270. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 102 (explaining that Illinois state mandate to increase 
its funding for pensions has caused municipal bond rating downgrades as well as cuts to 
essential services). 
 271. See, e.g., Gregory Pratt, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot Holds Final Budget Town 
Hall on City’s $838 Million Shortfall, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-lori-lightfoot-final-chicago-budget-town-hall-
20191003-pvytdkx4vfahbcbgix2utyos4y-story.html [https://perma.cc/YF7Q-PLBK] 
(outlining Mayor Lightfoot’s budget meeting intended to solve the deficit problem caused 
largely by pension obligations). 
 272. Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83, at 1. 
 273. See Krantz, supra note 159 (“Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the 
word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond 
market.”). 
 274. See Dick, supra note 145, at 77 (“Many chapter 9 debtors have simply chosen to be 
more generous to their employees and retirees, even if it requires cramming down a plan that 
severely impairs the rights of other creditors.”). 
 275. See, e.g., Robert Steyer, Moody’s Cuts New Jersey’s Credit Rating on Budget, 
Pension Funding Concerns, PENSIONS & INV. (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170328/ONLINE/170329882/moody-s-cuts-new-jersey-
s-credit-rating-on-budget-pension-funding-concerns [https://perma.cc/R77H-PDJZ] 
(“Moody’s Investors Service cut New Jersey’s general obligation bond rating by one notch 
due to ‘the continued negative impact of significant pension underfunding, including growth 
in the state’s large long-term liabilities, a persistent structural imbalance and weak fund 
balances,’ the firm said.”). 
 276. See, e.g., Karen Pierog,  Illinois Hangs on to Low Investment-Grade Credit Rating, 
REUTERS (June 4, 2019, 5:22 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-ratings/illinois-
hangs-on-to-low-investment-grade-credit-rating-from-moodys-idUSKCN1T52VX 
[https://perma.cc/5FXT-XBMK] (“The rating, which affects about $30.2 billion of 
outstanding debt, remains the lowest among U.S. states at a notch above the junk level due 
largely to Illinois’ huge unfunded pension liability and chronic structural budget deficit.”). 
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management obligation increases,277 leaving less state revenue to deal 
with the pension shortfall.278  In turn, a city ends up in a vicious cycle 
where its only means to catch up on pension contributions is to raise 
revenue with higher taxes or issue more debt.279  In most cases, cities 
increase taxes to raise revenue that provides limited improvement in 
tackling the underfunded pension obligations.280  Tax increases also drive 
residents to leave municipalities, resulting in  a smaller base from which 
to raise revenue.281  By the time a municipality files for bankruptcy, its 
underfunded pension obligation is massive, its crime and tax rate is high, 
and its essential services have faced major cuts and setbacks.282 
The bull market has masked both pension insecurities and the 
insolvent cities within states.283  Continued investment returns above 7% 
are unlikely as research firms call for a reevaluation of investors’ 
expected yearly returns in the investment market.284  With pension funds 
 
 277. Balcerzak, supra note 237. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See, e.g., Rob Kozlowski, Chicago Mayor Proposes $10 Billion in Bonds to Improve 
Pension Funding, PENSION & INVS. (Dec. 12, 2018, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20181212/ONLINE/181219858/chicago-mayor-proposes-
10-billion-in-bonds-to-improve-pension-funding [https://perma.cc/T9XM-A9P9] (explaining 
that then-mayor Rahm Emanuel proposed issuing $10 billion in municipal bonds specifically 
to improve Chicago’s pension funding); Shayndi Raice & Heather Gillers, Chicago Mayor 
Searches for Answers to Gaping Budget Hole, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-mayor-faces-huge-budget-shortfall-11567079128 
[https://perma.cc/FV39-6Z3V] (providing that Mayor Lightfoot proposes a variety of 
different taxes to ease to underfunded pension gap). 
 280. See, e.g., Hal Dardick & Juan Perez Jr, Despite Rahm Emanuel’s Tax Hikes. City 
Pension Debt Grew by $7 Billion Since 2015. Here’s Why., Chi. Trib. (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:57 
AM) https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-chicago-city-pension-fund-growth-
20191003-tdb6ah5u6vdk7gh3zrn6p65wgu-story.html [https://perma.cc/6UB4-9M2V] 
(explaining that despite a “record-high” property tax increase, a water and sewer tax increase, 
and a higher 911 emergency fee pension, deficits have still grown). 
 281. See supra Part II.A. 
 282. See, e.g., David Uberti, The Death of a Great American City, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/03/the-death-of-a-great-american-
city-why-does-anyone-still-live-in-detroit [https://perma.cc/FV39-6Z3V] (explaining the 
reasons Detroit failed). 
 283. See Anthony Mirhaydari, Pension Plans Are in Trouble (and Tt’s Going to Get 
wWrse), PITCH BOOK (Nov. 15, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/pensions-plans-
are-in-trouble-and-its-going-to-get-worse [https://perma.cc/B56U-UCJS] (“Many public and 
corporate pension plans are underfunded, with obligations outpacing assets, despite recently 
enjoying one of the greatest, most persistent equity bull markets in history.”). 
 284. See, e.g., Tim Koller, Mekala Krishnan, & Sree Raaswamy, Bracing for a New Era 
of Lower Investment Returns, MCKINSLEY & COMPANY (July 2016),  
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-
insights/bracing-for-a-new-era-of-lower-investment-returns [https://perma.cc/J6V7-3F6W] 
(“We believe that this golden age is now over and that investors need to brace for an era of 
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relying so heavily on investments, if a recession were to occur and the 
assumed rate of return for pensions is forced below 5%, the underfunded 
portions of the most stressed funds would likely amount to unsustainable 
liabilities.285  Municipalities within underfunded states may be left with 
no choice but to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy to restructure debt.286 
Nevertheless, municipal bonds can still be viewed as a positive 
investment for individuals because of their tax benefits and yield.287  
They are also useful tool for banks to purchase as assets for liquid capital 
purposes as well as income.288  There are healthy, high-rated municipal 
bonds outstanding within states that are managing their pension funds 
responsibly.289  However, the desire for “safe” risk-averse return in a low 
interest environment tends to push investors into less safe bonds that net 
a higher interest rate.290  In these cases, investors should monitor the 
municipalities in which their investments are issued and follow the states’ 
pension liabilities and reforms, because credit rating agencies look 
closely at a state’s pension health when assessing ratings.291  Credit 
agencies also use a lower discount rate when calculating a state’s total 
pension liability;292 therefore, numbers reported by the pension plan or 
media may not reflect the metrics the credit agencies apply.293  A state 
rated a notch or two above investment-grade, like Illinois, is most 
vulnerable to a rating change, which would have a large impact on the 
pricing and liquidity of its issued bonds.294 
Overall, municipal bond investors should heed the red flags of 
past bankruptcies and prepare for a higher default risk if the economy 
 
substantially lower investment returns… [and] project that total real returns in the next 20 
years could be between 4.0 and 6.5 percent for US equities . . . .”). 
 285. Cembalest, supra note 222. 
 286. Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83 at 3. 
 287. See Bladridge, supra note 30 (explaining tax-benefits of municipal bonds). 
 288. See supra Part II.C. 
 289. See Pension Funding Gap, supra note 84, at 6–7 (explaining states like South Dakota 
and North Carolina are managing their pension funds appropriately). 
 290. See supra Part I. 
 291. Nolan, supra note 149. 
 292. See Healey, supra note 227 (explaining credit rating agencies find pension plans have 
larger total pension liabilities then the plans report, because they use a smaller discount rate). 
 293. Id. 
 294. See, e.g.,  Karen Pierog, Seller’s Market Seen Aiding Illinois and Chicago Bond 
Issues, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2019, 6:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-
bonds/sellers-market-seen-aiding-illinois-and-chicago-bond-issues-idUSKCN1R60ZA 
[https://perma.cc/7KVE-BKA4] (“Budget measures, including the use of one-time revenue 
and a more than $800 million reduction in contributions to the state’s woefully underfunded 
pensions, could push Illinois closer to a junk credit rating.”). 
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slows or pension reforms fail to matriculate quickly enough to fix the 
massive pension liabilities facing some states and municipalities.295 
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